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ABSTRACT
WHAT IS INFLUENCING FINANCIALLY DRIVEN SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM IN THE US AND THE UK- PRINCIPAL-AGENT OR
PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS?
Maureen I. Muller-Kahle
Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. William Q. Judge

Shareholder activism is a response to corporate underperformance by one or more
shareholders of the corporation. Classic agency theory suggests that shareholder activism
is a mechanism to curb principal-agent problems in the firm. However, the principalprincipal perspective suggests that shareholder activism is a mechanism for dominant
shareholders to extract resources from the firm. This dissertation extends the current
research by developing and testing competing hypotheses to examine the antecedents of
financially driven shareholder activism in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The extant literature on financially driven shareholder activism (FDSA) is reviewed,
research gaps in the literature identified and a new model of shareholder activism is
introduced. Agency theory and the principal-principal perspective are used to develop
eight hypotheses, which are empirically tested.
Findings show that several proxies for the principal-principal perspective are
better predictors of FDSA than proxies from the principal-agent perspective. The study
also shows a positive relationship between FDSA and changes in long-term market-based
performance, a principal-agency prediction. The results also show that the relationship
between FDSA and change in subsequent firm performance is moderated by governance
environment. This study provides evidence that the principal-principal problems are not
just found in emerging market countries as previous studies show, but are also a problem

in developed countries like the US and the UK. In addition, this study suggests that
agency theory is limited in its explanatory power. For policymakers, this study questions
whether shareholder activism can act as an effective method to monitor corporate
management.
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1
WHAT IS INFLUENCING FINANCIALLY DRIVEN SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM IN THE US AND THE UK- PRINCIPAL-AGENT OR
PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS?
CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
The topic of corporate governance has garnered much attention in the recent past, mostly
due to the colossal failures of key firms such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco. Solomon
(2007: 14) defines corporate governance as "the system of checks and balances, both
internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their
accountability to all their shareholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of
their business activity." Shleifer & Vishny (1997:737) have a more narrow definition
when they state that corporate governance "deals with the ways that in which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment." Both
definitions state the importance of oversight of corporations by shareholders.
Firms are governed by both internal and external governance mechanisms (Denis
& McConnell, 2003). Specifically, internal governance mechanisms include the board of
directors and the ownership structure of the firm, while external governance mechanisms
are the market for corporate control and the legal system. In the past, agency theory has
been the dominant perspective in analyzing issues in corporate governance. Agency
theory suggests that there can be conflicts of interest between principals (shareholders)
and agents (management) and that monitoring by principals can be difficult or expensive
(Berle & Means, 1932).' Shareholders' interests are represented by a board of directors
that is responsible for overseeing the firm's management.
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The principal-agent perspective has received much attention in the literature, yet
little empirical support (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Monks and Minow
(1996) suggest that there is a breakdown in the governance system because these internal
and external governance systems aren't working to curb principal-agent problems, and
they argue that the shareholders need to be more assertive about proper corporate
governance. Indeed, anecdotal and systematic research suggests that this may be correct.
Previous research has shown that boards of directors are generally ineffective as
monitors, and some types of shareholders who own large blocks of stock are not acting as
active monitors of the firm (Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1988). Others suggest that the
enormous size of today's corporations make it very difficult for the takeover market to be
a major tool of corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, many
suggest that the legal system is too weak to act as an effective governance mechanism
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). The
recent corporate meltdowns of Enron, WorldCom, and Lloyd's are excellent examples
that the legal system is ineffective.
One shortcoming of classic agency theory is that it assumes that all shareholders
have the same objective of maximizing shareholder returns (Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008). On
the other hand, recent research suggests that principal-principal problems can occur in
companies whereby there is "incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups
in a corporation" (Su et al., 2008: 17). Specifically, there may be conflicts of interests
between large and small shareholders. Previous studies examining the principal-principal
problem have been largely based in emerging economies where majority shareholders
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collude with owners to expropriate resources from the firm (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom,
Bruton & Jiang, 2008).
This dissertation empirically tests the principal-agent and principal-principal
perspectives within the context of shareholder activism events within developed
economies. Shareholder activism (or "relational investing") has emerged as a key
mechanism for enhancing corporate governance in public corporations. Sjostrom (2008:
142) defines shareholder activism as "the use of ownership position to actively influence
company policy and practice. Shareholder activism can be exerted through letter writing,
dialogue with corporate management or the board, asking questions at open sessions in
general meetings, and through the filing of formal shareholder proposals." In general,
there are two types of shareholder activism: (1) efforts that are focused on improving
financial performance; and (2) socially driven activism with the objective of increased
corporate social responsibility. It is important to distinguish between the two types of
activism as both the antecedents and effects of activism may be different (Judge, Gaur, &
Muller-Kahle, 2010). This study focuses on the antecedents and effects of financially
driven shareholder activism (FDSA), as this type of activism has the most potential to
impact firm performance. Thus, most of the extant research on financially driven
shareholder activism attempts to determine if shareholder activism has had an impact on
firm performance and what types of investors see the highest returns from shareholder
activism efforts.
This study develops a competing set of hypotheses to empirically test the classic
agency principal-agent perspective versus the more recent principal-principal perspective
and asks the following three research questions. First, what firm characteristics are
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causing firms to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activism? Specifically, are
principal-agent problems driving shareholder activism or are principal-principal problems
causing firms to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activists? Second, does
financially driven shareholder activism impact firm performance? Agency theory would
suggest that the firms would see increased firm performance as a result of increased
monitoring while the principal-principal perspective would suggest that activists acting as
dominant shareholders extract resources from the firm to benefit their own position and
negatively impact firm performance. Third, does governance environment play any role
moderating the effects of shareholder activism?
Shareholders have three options to express their dissatisfaction with a firm: (1)
sell their shares, (2) continue to hold their shares and attempt to influence the firm, or (3)
passively continue to hold their shares in the hope that things will improve over time.
Option two is the path chosen by shareholder activists in economies where capital
markets are relatively liquid. However, activism is not costless and only shareholders
with knowledge and resources can attempt to "voice" their displeasure with
underperforming corporations (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Admati, Pfeiderer & Zechner,
1994). Thus, many investors are choosing option two and using shareholder activism
tactics to express their dissatisfaction with firm operations. On the other hand, there is
some evidence that some activists such as hedge funds target firms in order to make high
short-term profits from their shareholder activist tactics (Kulpa, 2005).
The topic of shareholder activism is both timely and relevant as shareholder
activism continues to grow not only in the United States, but all around the world. In
addition, this is the first study empirically testing the principal-principal perspective in
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the context of shareholder activism in developed economies. Firm managers need to be
aware of the triggers that will encourage shareholder activists to target firms. The study
is of importance to shareholders as the causes and effects of shareholder activism are
largely equivocal. With improved methodology, this study makes a solid contribution to
the body of knowledge on shareholder activism. Finally, this study is of importance to
scholars as this is one of the first to incorporate grounded theory into the study of
shareholder activism.
Types of shareholder activists
While any shareholder can engage in shareholder activism, there are three types
of investors who are garnering much attention from researchers. These investors
purchase large blocks of shares and attempt to influence corporate governance in the
firms in which they own shares within and across national economies. They include
blockholder activists, hedge funds and pension funds. Each of these groups is described
below.
Blockholder Activists. These shareholder activists were referred to as "corporate
raiders" in the 1980's (Faulkner, Mok & Swidler, 1990). Croci (2007: 952) defines a
corporate raider as "a minority shareholder who was expected to force changes in the
target firm's corporate policies, and based on his reputation for annoying incumbent
management." In this paper the term blockholder activists is used to refer to these
investors who own and operate their own investment companies. For example, Carl
Icahn, T. Boone Pickens, and George Soros are well known examples of blockholder
activists.
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Pension Fund Activists. Pension funds are a second group of potential
shareholder activists. In 2005, pension funds had assets of $8.1 trillion dollars in the US
and $1.6 trillion dollars in the UK (Pension Benefits, 2006). Pension funds don't have
the same constraints as mutual funds but are not as mobile as hedge funds. Pension funds
don't have the same diversification or liquidity requirements as mutual funds, are not
constrained by performance fees, and don't have the financial conflicts of interest that
mutual funds and insurance companies have. However, they are constrained as they are
political entities (Romano, 1993). Kahan and Rock (2006) note that political constraints
prevent pension funds from being as aggressive as hedge funds in their shareholder
activism tactics. Furthermore, pension funds are required to make quarterly disclosures
of their holdings. Last, pension fund managers are not incentivized as aggressively as
hedge funds managers.
Hedge Fund Activists. Hedge funds are unique in that they are pooled, privately
organized investment funds. They are currently unregulated in both the US and the UK
(Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008) and fund managers can hold larger positions without being
constrained by diversification requirements. They're also able to stipulate to their
investors that their funds will be locked up for certain time periods. Hedge fund
managers are also well compensated with packages that are aligned with company
performance. Their compensation can be up to 20% of the firm's annualized returns.
Hedge funds may have a greater ability and motivation than pension funds and mutual
funds to negotiate with company management. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas (2008)
found that activist hedge funds tend not to purchase the entire company. Instead, they
found that the median ownership stake is typically about 10%. They also report that

hedge funds have a success rate of about 41%, where success is defined by the ability to
institute the changes they would like to make.
Governance Environment for Shareholder Activism
Early studies on shareholder activism point to shareholder activism in the United
States. As early as 1970, shareholder activists submitted shareholder resolutions at the
General Motors annual meeting (Vogel, 1983). While shareholder activism is most
prevalent in the US and UK, it is spreading to other countries due to the globalization of
the capital markets (Gillan & Starks, 2003). More recently, research has expanded to
look at shareholder activism outside the United States (Anderson, Ramsay, Marshall &
Mitchell, 2007; Becht, Franks, Mayer & Rossi, 2009; Hernandez-Lopez, 2003; Lewis &
Mackenzie, 2000; Naruisch & Liepe, 2007; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; Seki, 2005; Yen &
Chen, 2005; Buchanan & Yang, 2009).
While the UK and the US are both common law countries with dispersed
ownership and high levels of institutional ownership, there are numerous differences in
governance environments. First, Aguilera, Williams, Conley, and Rupp (2006) note that
UK investors are more engaged than US investors as the Cadbury Report (1992) and the
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) encourages institutional investors to
engage in discussions with company management over corporate governance issues.
Furthermore, UK institutional investors are more likely to be able to meet with company
management (Holland, 1998). Second, Aguilera et al. (2006) report US investors are
more impatient than UK institutional investors and turn over their portfolios more
quickly. Third, it can be argued that UK shareholders have more rights than US
shareholders. UK shareholders can request an Extraordinary General Meeting with just
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10% of the shareholder votes. There is no opportunity for US shareholders to call special
meetings outside the annual shareholders' meeting. UK shareholder proposals are legally
binding, whereas in the US, shareholder proposals are non-binding. Last, while it is not
mandatory, most firms in the UK have adopted the recommendation issued by the
Cadbury Report (1992) to separate the Chairperson and CEO roles. Aguilera et al. (2006)
note that the majority of UK companies have separated the Chair and CEO roles while
the majority of US companies have continued to combine the two roles. In their case
study of shareholder activism by UK asset management companies, Hendry, Sanderson,
Barker and Roberts (2007) report that activism by institutional investors in the UK is
growing.
Previous Research on Shareholder Activism
Most of the prior work on shareholder activism has been conducted by the finance
and legal fields and is driven by archival data. In general, there are three major types of
studies. First, a large number of researchers study shareholder activism via the analysis
of proxy resolutions in the US (see Romano [2001] for a review). Success is measured by
the percentage of proxy votes received or via event studies which examine stock market
reactions to the announcement of proxy resolutions. Second, another body of research
examines pension funds that put target firms on publicized focus lists (Crutchley, Hudson
& Jensen, 1998; Opler & Sokobin, 1998; Caton, Goh & Donaldson, 2001; Song &
Szewczyk, 2003; English, Smythe & McNeil, 2004; Wu, 2004; Anson, White & Ho,
2003; 2004; Nelson, 2005; Barber, 2006; Nelson, 2006). Shareholder activism effects are
again measured via event studies measuring the impact of the announcement of a firm
being placed on a focus list. Third, some researchers track activism in the US by
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Schedule 13D filings, which a firm is required to file with the SEC after purchasing a 5%
or greater stake in the firm (see Klein & Zur, 2006; Boyson & Mooradian, 2007; Bratton,
2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008). Similar to previous
studies success is measured with event studies.
A thorough review reveals numerous gaps in the literature on shareholder
activism. First, while we have some understanding of the antecedents of shareholder
activism from the published literature, there has not been a thorough study of what is
driving shareholder activism since previous research has focused on the effects of
activism. Second, while the principal-agent perspective of agency theory has been
utilized in many studies, the principal-principal perspective is largely untested in
developed economies due to the theoretical assumption that such conflict does not occur.
Third, the majority of prior research measures short-term firm performance via event
studies (Faulkener et al., 1990; Wahal, 1996; Bethel, Liebeskind & Opler, 1998;
Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach,1998; Caton et al., 2001; Anson et al., 2003; English,
Smythe & McNeil, 2004; Nelson, 2005; Barber, 2006; Klein & Zur, 2006; Renneboog &
Szilagyi, 2006; Croci, 2007; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Del Guercio, Seery &
Woidtke, 2008; Prevost, Rao & Williams, 2009). More research is needed about the
long-term impact of shareholder activism on firm performance. Fourth, almost all the
previous research is focused on activism in the US (Gillan & Starks, 2003). Becht et al.
(2009) examined UK pension funds and suggest that the legal environment of each
country may impact the level and effectiveness of shareholder activism. Thus,
governance environments of different countries may encourage or discourage shareholder
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activism. Consequently, additional research is needed on shareholder activism in
countries other than the US.
This study is organized in the following manner. In Chapter II, the extant
literature on shareholder activism is reviewed and research gaps are identified. A
conceptual model of the causes and effects of shareholder activism is presented and
salient features described. Next, research hypotheses are developed to empirically test
whether principal-agent or principal-principal drivers are causing financially driven
shareholder activism within the firm and whether financially driven shareholder activism
has a positive or negative impact on firm performance. In Chapter III, the methodology is
presented with details on the research design, sample, operationalization of the variables
and the plan for data analysis. In Chapter IV, the empirical findings of the analyses are
presented. Chapter V discusses the results and their implications. Suggestions for future
research are also discussed along with limitations of the study and final conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL
In this chapter, the history of shareholder activism is briefly outlined and a thorough
review of the literature relating to the causes and effects of shareholder activism is
conducted. The following literature review is divided into three sections. First, prior
literature on the antecedents of shareholder activism is reviewed. Second, prior literature
on the effects of shareholder activism is examined. Third, while the bulk of shareholder
activism research has been conducted using US companies, the extant research on
shareholder activism outside the US is also reviewed.
Research gaps are then identified with theoretical foundations that can be used in
shareholder activism research. A new model of antecedents and effects of financially
driven shareholder activism is presented using competing theories. Finally, research
hypotheses are introduced which are empirically tested in Chapter IV after a discussion
on research methodology in Chapter III.
History of Shareholder Activism
Before examining the prior literature examining the causes and effects of
shareholder activism, one finds that shareholder activism has evolved over time. Gillan
and Starks (2007) and Marens (2002) trace the history of shareholder activism in the
United States. Gillan and Starks (2007) note that US financial institutions were the
primary outside monitors of US firms in the early 1900's.

With the crash of 1929, the

government began to limit the role of the financial institutions in corporate governance.
Gillan and Starks (2007) state that laws and regulations passed by the US government led
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to a widening gap between shareholders and control. In 1942, the SEC first allowed
proxy resolutions, and most shareholder activism was conducted by individual investors.
This led to the emergence of the so-called gadflies who attended annual shareholder
meetings to voice their disapproval on issues of governance, labor, and corporate social
responsibility. Marens (2002) writes that these gadflies included individual investors
and union leadership. Some of the more well-known gadflies included Lewis and John
Gilbert, who are regarded as two of the early proxy resolution pioneers, and Wilma Soss,
who founded the Federation of Women Shareholders. Lewis Gilbert began six decades
of activism with his attendance of the 1932 shareholder meeting of Consolidated Gas
Company (Talner, 1983). Marens (2002) notes that these early shareholder activists were
able to garner attention for future discussions on expanding ownership rights.
Table 1 provides an overview of the shareholder activism literature. In the
1980's, shareholder activism was mostly in response to the emergence of corporate
raiders and management teams who were paying greenmail to fend off takeovers
(Marens, 2002; Gillan & Starks, 2007). The 1980s were also the first time institutional
investors began to get involved in shareholder activism. At this time, the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) began to get more active in shareholder
activism. Empirical work on shareholder activism was also in its infancy.
In the 1990's, US regulatory changes brought increased levels of activism. There
was a movement away from full takeovers to a more politically based type of shareholder
activism (Black, 1992; Pound, 1992). In 1992, the SEC changed its regulations on proxy
resolutions, making it easier to get a proxy resolution on the ballot to be voted on during
an annual shareholder meeting.
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Develops a theoretical model where
large shareholders can benefit from
expending resources to monitor
investments even though passive
shareholders also benefit via freeriding

examined how board politics within
pension funds could limit their
effectiveness as shareholder
activists
Looked at 42 Calpers investments
from 1987-1992 and found market
based performance increases of 41%

Comments
Looked at 266 shareholder
resolutions in 1990

1997 Empirical

Johnson &
Shackell

Poor
performance,

Proxy
resolutions,
letters and
meetings
proxy
resolutions

No CARs upon
announcement of targeting,
no change in accounting or
market performance
no effect on changes in
executive compensation

Study of 169 executive
compensation proposals made by 74
sponsors against 106 firms from 1992
to 1995

356 targets of 146 firms from 1987 to
1993.

Comments
Antecedents
Mechanism Effects
no measurable impact on
Looked at 51 firms targeted by
larger Firms,
letter to
higher levels of management, shareholder value in short- CalPERS from 1987 to 1993.
meetings, term or long-term, 7% made
institutional
proxy
governance changes.
ownership,
However, firms that agreed
poor stock
with Calper requests had
performance,
increased shareholder
returns
216 proposals at 85 firms between
Poor stock
negotiated CARs of .9% upon
1990-1993. Looked at measure
performance, agreements, announcement ofa
High
proxy
negotiated agreement for 53 success by the percentage of votes
institutional
resolutions of the 85 firms before going cast.
ownership,
to proxy resolution stage.
executive
,
compensation
payouts there
were unrelated
to firm
performance,
lower market to
book values

gadflies, institutional
high CEO
investors,
compensation,
firm
performance

9 large Pension funds

1996 Empirical

Wahal

Type of Activist
Pension FundCalpers

US Shareholders
Association

Topic of
Year Study
1996 Empirical

Strickland, Wiles 1996 Empirical
& Zenner

Author(s)
Smith

TABLE 1 COIVTI>fUED

1998 Empirical

Tope of
Year Study
1998 Empirical

1998 Empirical

1998 Empirical

Crutchley,
Hudson &
Jensen

Mulherin &
Poulsen

Carleton, Nelson 1998 Empirical
& Weisbach

Bizjak&
Marquette

Author(s)
Bethel,
Leibeskind, &
Opler

TABLE 1 CO]VTI>fUED
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Mechanism
Type of Activist
Antecedents
Activist blockholders LowROA,low purchase of
market/book,
5% equity
highly
stake
diversified
.
companies,
lower insider
ownership,
smaller firm
poor firm
shareholder
multiple
performance, resolutions to
insider
remove poison
ownership-low,
pill
block
ownership low
Pension Fund-TIAA- large firms,
Proxy
CREF
resolutions,
concentrated
letters and
ownership of
meetings
activist
institutions
Pension fundpoor stock
public
Calpers
market
announcement
ofCalpers
performance,
targets
Poor
various
Proxy contests
performance

65 targeting of 45 firms by TIAACREF from 1992 -1996, negotiated
agreements usually successful

50% are successful in getting 270 proxy contests for board seats
a board seat, 61% are
from 1979 to 1994,
successful in replacing CEO,
on the whole, proxy contests
increase share value

for the Calpers CEO from
Study of 47 firms targeted by Calpers
1992-1994 than 1995-1997 due from 1992-1997
to shift in CEO

Insignificant CAR's around
announcenjent of activism

restructure or rescind poison 193 resolutions involving poison
pill
pills from 1986-1993
*

Comments
Effects
Increased CEO turnover,
151 activist block purchases in the
increase in asset divested,
1980s who bought a 5% share
decline in mergers and
T
acquisitions, increased share
repurchase, higher short term
stock gains, higher ROA 3
years after

2000 Empirical

2000 Empirical

Prevost & Rao

. < *

Gillan & Starks

••

1999 Empirical

-

1999 Empirical

-•

1998 Empirical

1998 Empirical

Campbell, Gillan
& Niden

Del Guercio &
Hawkins

Schwab &
Thomas
Thomas &
Martin

Topic of
Author(s)
Year Study
Opler & Sokobin 1998 Empirical

TABLE 1 COlVTI>WED

pension funds

all activists

all activists

v«

pension funds,
unions, individual
investors, and others
Pension fund- 5
largest funds

Type of Activist
Council of
Institutional
Investors
Unions
proxy
resolutions
proxy
resolutions

NA

no measures

no measures

proxy
resolutions
proxy
resolutions

proxy
resolutions

126 proposals made by unions at 94
firms in 1996-1997
309 proxy resolutions in 1994.
Analyzed proxy votes

Comments
96firmsfrom1991-1993

no short term impact on
stock price
Negative returns after proxy
mailings

governance proposals get
more voter support than
social proposals

descriptive study of all the proxy
resolutions filed during the 1997
proxy season including 582
corporate governance proposals at
394 companies
2042 proxy resolutions submitted at
451 companies from 1987-1994.
1988-1994 128 proxy resolutions in 73
firms

Director or TMT turnover
Study of 266 proposals at 125 firms
by the top 5 pension funds 1987defined as increase in
shareholder lawsuit/other
1993
proxy resolutions or vote no
for director. Management
response: (asset sale, firm reorg, layoffs). No evidence of
effects on stock returns or
accounting measures.

NA

NA

Mechanism Effects
make target positive one year share
list public returns (average of 11.6%)

mixed- some
proxy
target poor "'resolutions
performance.

NA

Antecedents
poor stock
price
performance
NA

English, Smythe 2004 Empirical
& McNeil

Wu

2004 Empirical
pension fund Calpers

Pension Fund- •
Calpers

2003 Empirical

Song&
Szewczyk

Arison, White & 2003 Empirical
Ho

Council of
Institutional
Investors
pension-CalPERS

2002 Empirical

Woidke

Antecedents
poor stock
performance

poor stock
performance,
poor
governance
practices, BOD
size (under 5 or
over 15)

poor stock
performance

... .-

NA

poor stock
Council of
performance
Institutional
Investors
pension funds- public
NA
vs. private

Type of Activist
all activists

2001 Empirical

Topic of
Year Study
2000 Emp ideal

Caton, Goh &
Donaldson

Author(s)
Choi

TABLE 1 CO]vri>WED

Comments
1991-1995 - 361 proxy resolutions in
277 companies. Compared pre and
post 1992 proxy reform voting
138 companies 1991-1995

make target
list public

make target
list public

make target
list public

Short'term stock
performance, but no
evidence of gains after 6
months
CEO turnover, reduce board
size.

1988-1995,37 firms

1992-1997,63 targets in 43 firms

significant CARs of 12% for Companies on the focus list from
the 90 trading days following 1992-2001. Authors are CalPERS
target list announcement
employees

Negative stock market
reaction to firms in the focus
list
Monitoring private pension funds
1765 observations 359firmsfrom
the monitor companies perform better
1989-1993. Suggests that private
than public
pension funds may be more
performance focused that public
pension funds
make target No evidence of short term
1991-1996,156 firms
list public gains

make target
list public

Mechanism Effects
NA
proxy
resolutions

pension-CalPERS

2005 Empirical

2005 Empirical

2006 Empirical

2006 Empirical

2006 Conceptual hedge funds, pension
funds, mutual funds

Nelson

Thomas, Cotter
& Draft

Akyol & Carroll

Barber

Kahan & Rock

pension fundCalPERS

various- individuals,
investment funds,
pension funds

various

Type of Activist
pens ion-CalPERS

Tope of
Author(s)
Year Study
Anson, White & 2004 Empirical
Ho

TABLE 1 COlVTIIVflJED

board
independence
& insider
shareholding
positively
related to
outcome
NA

Poor
performance

NA

Antecedents

make target
list public

.proxy
resolutions,
negotiations

proxy
resolutions

list public

small but significant short
term stock gains and 5 year
gains outperformed market
by 32%

researched number of votes
for proxy resolutions, no
impact on shareholder
returns
removal of poison pills

announcement of target list

Mechanism Effects
make target excess returns of 59% for the
•
list public
year following release of
list of CARs after
make target target
no evidence

hedge fund are very different from
other shareholder activists in terms
of structure, operations and
objectives

115 firms from 1992-2005 on CalPERS
target list

126 Firms who removed poison pills
from 1990-2004

pre and post Enron,1,454 resolutions
from 2002-2004

Comments
Companies on the focus list from
1992-2001. Authors are CalPERS
employees
Questions event study methodology
of Anson, White, &Ho (2003,2004)
studies. 92 firms on CalPERS focus
list from 1992-1994

Topic of
Year Study
2006

2006 Empirical

2006 Empirical

2007 Empirical

2007 Empirical

Author(s)
Klein & Zur

Nelson

Renneboog &
SzUagyi

Boyson &
Mooradian

Bratton

TABLE 1 CO]VTIr>fUED

hedge funds

hedge funds

various

Pension fiindCalpers

Type of Activist
hedge funds

underperformin
g companies,
very large firms
high cash
holdings, poor
growth
prospects. Low
Q
smaller firms,
high cash

prel994 finds positive CARs Suggested methodology problems
and no evidence of positive with 4 prior studies examining the
CARs after 1994
CAR's around the release of the
focus list. Studied 103firmsfrom
1990-2003
2,800 shareholder proposals 1996Positive CAR's upon
announcement
2005

Effects
Comments
10.3% CAR after
155firmstargeted by hedge funds in
announcement of the
2003-2005
schedule 13 D. filing,
dividends double within 1
year, board seat 72% of the
time. Long-term- find decline
in EPS, ROA, ROE 1 year
after the 13 D. filing

13D filingsbought 5%+
stake,
communicatio
n, proxy
contest will

BOD seat 23% of the time,
130firmstargeted by hedge funds
cash payout 58%, asset sold from 2002-2006, descriptive study
45%, CARs 16% during the only
three days surrounding the
announcement

13D filings- positive impact on short-term 111 Hedge funds targeting 397 firms
bought 5%+ stock performance, positive from 1994-2005
impact on long-term
stake
operating performance
*

proxy
resolutions

make target
list public

Antecedents
Mechanism
profitable firms 13D filingsbought 5%+
stake

O

2008 Empirical

Clifford

Prevost, Rao &
Williams

2009 Empirical

i

Del Guercio,
2008 Empirical
Seery & Woidke

2008 Empirical

Topic of
Year Study
2007 Empirical

Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy &
Thomas

Author(s)
Greenwood &
Schor

TABLE 1 CONTI>flJED

labor union activism

usually public
pension funds

hedge funds

hedge funds

Type of Activist
hedge funds

large firms,
poor
performance
NA

low market
value relative
to book value,
profitable with
good cash
flows

Effects
asset sale, CEO/Chair
turnover, board seat
acquired, hedge fund targets
more likely to be acquired

13D filings short-term large positive
average abnormal returns
between five and 7% during
the announcement window.
ROE and ROA also
increased, increase in CEO
turnover
13D (active excess return of 3.39% after
investor) and announcement of the 13 D.
13G filings filing, large positive 1.22%
increase in operating
(passive
efficiency as measured by
investor)
ROA in the year following
the acquis itibn
"just vote no" 25% CEO turnover rate, small
on proxy
positive CAR upon
resolutions announcement
proxy
No effects on CARs upon
resolutions announcement of proxy
filing. However, positive
CARs and increased board
independence for proposals
with majority-vote status

Mechanism
Antecedents
smaller firms, 13D filings &
lowQ,
proxy
underperformin resolutions
g

1988-2002 387 proposals

112 just vote no campaigns from
1990-2003

1902firmfund observations -1998
and 2005

888 events by 131 activists hedge
funds from 2001 through 2005

Comments
784 hedge funds & 196 non hedge
funds from 1993 and 2006 and 990
events,

Case study of Olivetti's hostile
takeover of Telecom Italia

2007 Case Study SA in Italy

Kruse

Proxy contest top management team
turnover and Board of
Directors turnover

descriptive in nature
Studied 82 proxy contests from 1994
to 1999 in Taiwan

2005 Conceptual SA in Japan
unknown
2005 Empirical

Seki
Yen & Chen
NA

Case Study of LVMH's bid for Gucci
and BNP's bid forParabas and SG

blockholder no impact on performance,
purchase of
3%

2003 Case Study SA in Europe

lower market
value of
equity, smaller
firms, lower Q

HernandezLopez

occupational pension
funds in the UK

2000 Empirical

Faccio & Lasfer

Examines prior research on
institutional ownership and
corporate governance across the
world
289firms,356 large stakes held by 99
individual occupational pension
funds in 1995-1996

93% of ethical investors avoid
companies with poor business ethics
and 62% invest in companies with
poor business ethics in an effort to
change them

Comments

2003 Review

descriptive stats only

Mechanism Effects

Gillan & Starks

SA in India by large
shareholders

Antecedents

2000 Empirical

ethical investors in
the UK

Type of Activist

Sarkar & Sarkar

Topic of
Author(s)
Year Study
GLOBAL STUDIES
Lewis &
2000 EmpiricalMackenzie
descriptive

TABLE 1 COIVTttfUED

2009 Empirical

2009 Empirical

Buchanan &
Yang

Becht .Franks,
Mayer & Rossi

Hedge funds activists smaller firms,
declining
in Germany
profitability
Various
low market to
book, % of
outsiders on
the board,
board size, Ceo
duality, debt
ratio
Hermes Focus Fund underperformin
in the UK
g, thinks it can
engage the co,
and expects to
see a return of
20% or more.

Bessler, Drobetz 2008 Empirical
& Holler

Antecedents

blockholder activists lower market to
book values
in Europe

2007 Conceptual SA in Nigeria

Topic of
Year Study
Type of ActiVist
2007 Case Study SA in Australia by
Unions

2007 Empirical

Author (s)
Anderson,
Ramsay,
Marshall &
Mitchell
Amao &
Amaeshi
Croci

TABLE 1 CONTENHJED

state of CGin Nigeria

Comments
Case study of 4 Australian Unions

restructuring, board changes, Access to Hermes internal
improve operational
documents. Tracked 41 investments
management, TMT turnover made between 1998-2004

Studied US and UK shareholder
proposals from 2000-2006 - 3,812
proposals at 764 USfirmsand 508
proposals at 85 UK firms

positive CARs upon
Studied 136 investments by 15
announcement of
raiders from 1990-2001
acquisition, long term gains
positive and sign when they
sell their stakes, do better
when they have smaller
ownership shares
increase shareholder value in 324 events between 2000-2007
short and long term

shareholder postive impact on LT stock
proposals price performance, reduce
board size, increased CEO
turnover

Newspaper
searches

Newspaper
searches

Mechanism Meets
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In the UK, a weak governance environment in the 1980's characterized by
ineffective monitoring by UK boards (Florackis & Ozkan, 2004) and concerns about
managerial behavior (Toms & Wright, 2005) led to numerous voluntary guidelines being
introduced starting with the Cadbury Report (1992).
In their study of US proxy resolutions from 1988 to 1998, Graves, Rehbein and
Waddock (2001) report that governance related resolutions did not appear on proxy
resolutions until 1993 but have grown steadily since then. They also report that
compensation-related activism via proxy resolutions did not start until 1995. In addition,
labor union pension funds and hedge funds began to get more active in financially driven
activism. Takeover activity by corporate raiders slowed down (Gillan & Starks, 2007).
During the last fifteen years, there have been four major changes that have
impacted shareholder activism. The first change is the continued growth of institutional
investor ownership. Gillan and Starks (2007) note that institutional investor ownership in
the US was approximately 10% in 1953 and reached over 60% by 2005. In the UK,
institutional investor ownership is even higher at over 80% (ONS, 2007). The second
change is the increased use of proxy resolutions by all types of investors. The number of
proxy resolutions from 1987 to 1994 grew to 2,042 from 1,730 for the period between
2001 and 2005 (Gillan & Starks, 2007).
The third change is the tremendous growth of the hedge fund industry in the last
decade. As of 2006, there were 8,000 hedge funds with over $1 trillion under
management (Economist, 2006:78). Kahan and Rock (2006) report that hedge funds are
different from other types of shareholder activists because of their structure, operations
and objectives. They do not operate under the same regulatory and political constraints
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on the other types of activists. They have few conflicts of interest and their managers are
extremely well compensated. They have been accused of being too short-term focused at
the expense of the long-term profitability of their target firms.
The fourth change is that investors must file a schedule 13D with the SEC after
they have purchased a 5% or higher stake in a US company and must state their future
intentions as more active investors. Thus, many recent studies on activism in the US
have tracked shareholder activism after a schedule 13D filing has occurred.
In summary, over the years, shareholder activism research has been almost
entirely focused on US-based firms. There is only one published study of shareholder
activism in the UK. Becht et al. (2009) performed a case study on the Hermes UK Focus
Fund, a pension fund owned by British Telecom, and had insider access to company
records.
Antecedents of Shareholder Activism
In this section, previous literature focusing on the antecedents and effects of
shareholder activism is reviewed. Looking at antecedents of shareholder activism, there
are four areas within a firm in which researchers have found antecedents of shareholder
activism: the firm, the CEO, the board of directors and ownership. First, firm
characteristics such as prior firm performance, firm size, amount of diversification,
growth prospects, and levels of free cash flow are the most commonly studied
antecedents of shareholder activism. Only a few studies have looked at how shareholder
activism could be driven by ownership structure.
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Firm characteristics
Prior Firm Performance. Numerous US-based studies have found that the prior
performance of firms has led shareholder activists to target firms. Studies have
measured firm performance with market based measures and financial measures.
Predominantly, most types of activists target firms with poor performance or for being
undervalued via measures like book to market or Tobin's Q. However, Klein and Zur
(2006) did find evidence that US hedge funds in their sample targeted profitable firms.
A few studies used proxy resolutions as the mechanism of shareholder activism
and found evidence that multiple types of investor groups target companies due to
performance issues. Bizjak and Marquette (1998) studied multiple types of activists who
were using shareholder resolutions in an effort to remove poison pills in target firms.
With a sample of 193 resolutions in the US involving poison pills from 1986 to 1993,
they found that poor performance by target companies and making management
resistance to restructuring or removing their poison pills was a predictor of FDSA.
Johnson and Shackell-Dowell (1997) conducted a study of 169 executive
compensation proposals made by 74 shareholder activists against 106 US firms from
1992 to 1995. They found that poor performance led to firms being targeted by gadflies
and institutional investors.
Choi's (2000) study of 361 proxy resolutions targeting 277 US companies from
1991 to 1995 found that poor stock performance was driving the issuance of proxy
resolutions. Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) studied proxy contests for board seats
between 1979 and 1994. In their sample of 270 US proxy contests, they found that firms
with poor performance were more likely to be targeted for a proxy contest effort.
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Thomas et al. (2005) examined 1,454 proxy resolutions in the US from 2000 to 2004 and
found that poor performance was also driving shareholder activism efforts. Renneboog
and Szilagyi (2006) used a sample of 2,800 shareholder proposals in the US from 1996 to
2005 and also found that shareholder activists targeted underperforming companies.
More recently, Buchanan and Yang (2009) studied US and UK shareholder
proposals from 2000 to 2006 with 3,812 proposals at 764 US firms and 508 proposals at
85 UK firms and found that shareholder activists target firms with low book to market
ratios.
Other studies looked at shareholder activism efforts of investor groups like the US
Shareholders Association and the Council of Institutional Investors. Strickland, Wiles
and Zenner (1996) examined shareholder activism efforts of the US Shareholders
Association. Their sample consisted of 216 proposals at 85 US firms between 1990 and
1993. They found that poor stock performance was a key antecedent of shareholder
activism. Opler and Sokobin (1998) and Caton et al. (2001) both use samples derived by
shareholder activism targets of the Council of Institutional Investors. Opler and
Sokobin's (1998) sample was 96 US firms from 1991 to 1993 and Caton et al.'s (2001)
sample was 138 US companies from 1991 to 1995. Both studies found that the Council
of Institutional Investors targeted firms with poor stock performance.
Among blockholder activists, Bethel et al. (1998) examined block share purchases
in the 1980's and focused on investors like Carl Icahn, Jacobs S. Brothers, Mario Cavalli
and George Soros. Like many other studies, they found that these US activists almost
always target firms which are not meeting financial performance targets. In their study,
performance was measured by low profitability as measured by ROA and low market to
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book values. Their sample consisted of 151 activist block purchases of 5% or greater
equity stake made during the 1980's.
Croci (2007) studied blockholder activists in Europe using a sample of 136
investments made in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK by 15 blockholder
activists from 1990 to 2001. He found that blockholder activists targeted firms with
lower book to market values.
A number of researchers have found a negative relationship between prior firm
performance and shareholder activism among pension funds. There were four studies
that have focused on shareholder activism of multiple US-based pension funds. First,
Wahal (1996) looked at shareholder activism efforts of nine large US pension funds via
proxy resolutions, letters, and meetings using a sample of 356 targets within 146 firms
from 1987 to 1993 and found they often targeted poor performing firms. Second,
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walking (1996) examined 269 US companies facing 522
shareholder resolutions from 1986 to 1990 and found that many shareholder resolutions
by a mix of public and private investor groups and individual investors were targeted at
companies with poor performance. Third, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) studied 266
proxy resolutions at 125 firms by the five largest US pension funds from 1987 to 1993
and found that some, but not all, of the pension funds targeted firms with poor
performance. Last, the Del Guercio et al. (2008) study focused on "just vote no" proxy
resolutions issued by public pension funds. Their sample included 112 just vote no
campaigns in the US from 1990 to 2003 and found that public pension funds targeted
firms with poor firm performance.
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Shareholder activism by the US-based CalPERS pension fund has also been
widely studied. Nesbitt (1994) looked at 42 investments made by the CalPERS pension
fund from 1987 to 1992 and found that CalPERS targeted underperforming companies
using market-based performance measures. All of the following studies found that
CalPERS targeted firms with poor stock price performance. Smith (1996) studied
shareholder activism efforts by CalPERS using a sample of 51 firms targeted by
CalPERS from 1987 to 1993. Crutchley et al. (1998) studied public announcements
made by CalPERS announcing the firms who were on their focus list. Their sample
included 47 firms targeted by CalPERS from 1992 to 1997. In 2004, English et al. also
studied 63 targets in 43 firms from 1992 to 1997 that were placed on the CalPERS focus
list. Last, Wu (2004) looked at 37 firms from 1988 to 1995 that were on the CalPERS
focus list.
Finally, Becht et al. (2009) looked at shareholder activism in the UK by one
pension fund, the Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF), from 1998 to 2004. In 2005,
HUKFF had 61 billion pounds under management. Their sample consisted of 41
companies of which the fund had discussions with 30. UK laws require companies make
a public disclosure when they have acquired just 3% of the firm shares. Becht et al.'s
(2009) main innovation is the study of one fund with full insider access to records of the
fund's activities. According to internal documents, one of the three criteria for targeting
firms is that the firm is underperforming.
Looking at hedge funds, four studies found that prior firm performance impacted
US hedge funds decision to target a firm. Many of these studies used measures of
Tobin's Q as an indicator of a firm's market performance. Tobin's Q is defined as the
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market value of a firm's assets divided by the replacement costs of a firm's assets
(Brainard & Tobin, 1968). If a firm has a Q value of greater than one, it presumes the
existence of intangible assets which bring up the value of the firm above and beyond the
value of its physical assets. Doukas (1995) suggests that well-managed firms have a
Tobin's Q value of over one and poorly-managed firms have Tobin's Q values less than
one. Hedge funds often consider Q values to identify and target poorly managed firms.
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) looked at US hedge funds from 1994 to 2005 with a
sample of 111 hedge funds and 89 hedge fund management companies and 397 target
firms. They found that the hedge funds in their sample targeted firms with low measures
of Tobin's Q and low stock performance. Greenwood and Schor (2007) found that US
hedge funds targeted firms with low market-to-book ratios and those who were
underperforming in their industry. They also show that hedge funds target firms with
lower long-term industry abnormal returns funds using a sample of 784 hedge funds from
1993 to 2006. Brav et al. (2008) looked at shareholder activism by US hedge funds and
used a sample of 888 events by 131 activist hedge funds from 2001 through 2005. They
find that hedge funds target companies with low market value relative to book value.
More recently, a study on hedge funds in Germany finds that hedge funds target firms
with declining profitability (Bessler, Drobetz & Holler, 2008)
Surprisingly, Klein and Zur's (2006) study was the only one that found that hedge
funds were more likely to target cash-rich, profitable firms. They tracked 155 firms
targeted by US hedge funds from 2003 to 2005. They note that hedge funds target
profitable firms with the goal of short term gains via increased dividend payouts and
short-term increases in stock price. The shareholder activism literature clearly points to
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firms being targeted by numerous types of shareholder activists for poor firm
performance.
Firm size. Previous activism research also suggests that there may be a
relationship between firm size and the likelihood of shareholder activism. However,
empirical results find support for both positive and negative effects. The following four
US-based studies find support for shareholder activists targeting larger firms. Three of
the four studies examined pension fund activism. Smith (1996) studied CalPERS
activism, while Del Guercio et al. (2008) studied "just vote no" campaigns on proxy
resolutions, and Carleton et al. (1998) looked at 65 targets in 45 firms targeted by the
pension fund TIAA-CREFF from 1992 to 1996. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006)
studied over 2,800 shareholder proposals by various types of activists from 1996 to 2005
and found that large firms were targeted by shareholder activists.
While many of the studies found support for activists targeting smaller firms,
studies on shareholder activism by blockholder activists and hedge funds find that these
activists tend to target smaller firms in order to be able to purchase a 5% or larger share
of equity in the target company. Bethel et al. (1998) found that the activist blockholders
of the 1980's targeted smaller firms. Woidtke (2002) found that pension fund activists
were more likely to target smaller firms than larger firms in the US. Faccio and Lasfer
(2000) find that UK pension funds tended to target smaller firms when engaging in
activist efforts through block share purchases. Boyson and Mooradian (2007), Bratton
(2007) and Greenwood and Schor (2007) found that hedge fund activists prefer smaller
firms as target firms in the US. One potential reason for this relationship is that
financially driven activists may prefer to limit the cost of activism and that smaller firms
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are expected to cost less to prod into taking action. In addition, larger firms have the
resources and political connections to resist shareholder activism (Hibbard, 2005).
Free cash flow. Free cash flow is excess cash that could be distributed to
shareholders in the form of extra dividends. Bratton (2007) examined a sample of 130
domestic firms between 2002 and 2006 that were targeted by hedge funds and found that
many target companies have high levels of free cash flow. Bratton (2007) defines high
levels of cash flow as cash to total assets ratio of 0.15 or greater plus a cash-to-debt ratio
of 0.50 or greater. Bratton (2007) finds that 38% of the target firms in the sample are
cash rich. Brav et al. (2008) also finds that hedge funds target firms with high levels of
excess cash.
It is a classic agency argument that high levels of free cash flow create agency
problems in that managers can invest in low net present value projects (Griffin &
Wiggins, 1992; Cuthbertson & Gasparro, 1995)

Jensen (1986) argues that high levels of

free cash flow create agency problems between shareholders and managers over whether
excess cash should be used within the firm or redistributed to shareholders in the form of
dividends or share buybacks. However from a principal-principal perspective, high
levels of cash flow enable easy extraction of assets from the firm in the form of increased
dividend payouts.
Board of Director Characteristics
There are only a handful of studies that have found empirical evidence of links
between board of director characteristics and shareholder activism. These studies
examined board composition (i.e., the make-up of insiders versus outsiders serving on the
board), CEO duality, and board of director size. Only three studies examined how board
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structure may be a cause of shareholder activism, and the empirical results find support
that shareholder activists target firms with a higher percentage of insiders. First, Wahal
(1996) finds that the nine largest US pension funds target firms with high percentages of
insiders on the board of directors. Second, Akyol and Carroll (2006) find that US firms
targeted for poison pill removal were more likely to act when the board of directors had a
higher percentage of outsiders.

Third, Buchanan and Yang (2009) in their study of US

and UK shareholder proposals present contradictory findings and find that activists target
firms with high percentages of outsiders on the board.
Wu (2004) found evidence that board of director size is an antecedent of
shareholder activism by the CalPERS pension fund. He found that CalPERS was more
likely to include a firm on its focus list if the total number of board members was under 5
or over 15. Buchanan and Yang (2009) show a positive relationship between board size
and activism in their sample of UK and US shareholder proposals.
Finally, Wahal (1996) and Buchanan and Yang (2009) also looked at the issue of
CEO duality, which occurs when the CEO also holds the Chairperson of the Board
position. Wahal (1996) found that US pension funds were more likely to target firms that
had CEO duality, and Buchanan and Yang (2009) found similar results in their sample of
US and UK shareholder proposals.
In conclusion, only a limited number of studies examined whether board structure
or other board of director characteristics may be causing firms to be targeted by
shareholder activists. However, the findings require consideration in our research. In the
next section, evidence of ownership characteristics and shareholder activism are
examined.

34

Ownership Structure
Prior studies have looked at whether shareholder activists have targeted firms
because of their ownership structures. Specifically, some work has looked at levels of
institutional ownership and/or insider ownership as a predictor of shareholder activism.
Stickland et al. (1996) found that firms targeted by the US Shareholders Association were
more likely to be targeted if they had high levels of institutional ownership. Bizjak and
Marquette (1998) found that poison pill resolutions were more likely to be put forward
when block ownership was low. Carleton et al. (1998) found evidence of some
bandwagon effects as the pension fund, TIAA-CREFF, was more likely to target firms
that had a concentrated ownership of activist institutions.
Three studies looked at insider ownership as an antecedent of shareholder
activism. Bethel et al. (1998) found that firms with low insider ownership are more
likely to be targeted among activist blockholders. Both Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and
Akyol and Carroll (2006) studied proxy resolutions directed at poison pill removal and
both found that insider shareholding was negatively associated with activists' efforts to
remove poison pills via proxy resolutions and negotiations.
Again, relatively little is known about how ownership characteristics of firms lead
them to be targeted by shareholder activists. To the best of the author's knowledge, there
is no prior research that has looked at UK firms. Next, the literature on the effects of
shareholder activism is explored.
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Effects of shareholder activism
In this section, the prior literature looking at the effects of shareholder activism is
reviewed. The bulk of the studies on shareholder activism have examined the impact of
shareholder activism on firm performance. Prior literature has also examined effects
such as turnover in the top management team and board of director ranks, acquisition of
board seats, changes to board composition or size, executive compensation, and strategic
changes such as acquisitions or divestments, and changes to the company's handling of
excess cash via dividend payouts and/or stock repurchases.
Activism's Impact on Firm Performance.
The activism literature shows equivocal results of shareholder activism's impact
on either short-term or long-term financial results using either market-based or
accounting-based measures. Short-term market-based returns focus on cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR's) around the announcement window after an activist "goes
public" with his or her dissatisfaction or after an activist files a schedule 13D with the
SEC indicating that the activist has purchased a 5% equity stake. Typically, short-term
market based performance measures changes in market-based performance up to 90 days
after the announcement. Measures of long-term performance typically report returns one
year or more after the activist announcement of proxy resolution or an equity purchase
using accounting-based and/or market-based measures.
Many researchers have found no impact on firm performance. Three literature
reviews conducted by Black (1998), Romano (2001) and Karpoff (2001) report
insignificant effects on firm performance. Black (1998) examines shareholder activism
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by institutional investors, Romano (2001) reviews nine studies of pension funds and
investment groups and Karpoff (2001) reviews 25 studies from 1994 to 2001.
Impacts on Short-term Market-based Firm Performance. Many researchers
use event studies and attempt to capture CAR's around the announcement of a proxy
resolution, purchase a 5% equity stake, or that a particular firm has been placed on a
pension fund's focus list. Again, past research has been primarily US-based unless noted
otherwise. Looking at shareholder activism by activist blockholders, short term returns
are largely positive. Faulkener et al. (1990) find short-term CAR's of 2.8% after the
announcement and 81 day returns of 11.74%. Bethel et al. (1998) find short term stock
gains upon the announcement of the purchase of 5% or greater equity stake. Finally,
Croci's (2007) study of blockholder activists in Europe finds positive CARs upon
announcement of acquisition by a blockholder activist.
Short-term return results are mixed for two studies that looked at investor groups.
While Strickland et al. (1996) find positive CAR's for firms targeted by the US
Shareholders Association, Caton et al. (2001) report negative CAR's upon the
announcement of being placed on a Council of Institutional Investor target list.
Examining the research on pension funds, the impact on short-term returns is
equivocal. Wahal (1996), Carleton et al. (1998) and Nelson (2005) find no evidence of
CAR's. Other researchers measuring CAR's upon the announcement of being placed on
a CalPERS focus list find positive returns (Anson et al., 2003; English et al., 2004,
Barber, 2006). Nelson (2005) argues that the Anson et al. (2003) study contains many
methodological flaws and that the researchers in this study are also CalPERS employees
and could have conflict of interest.
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On the whole, hedge funds achieve positive CAR's upon the announcement of the
13D filing signifying an equity purchase of 5% or more. Klein and Zur (2006) report a
CAR of 10.3% after a 13D filing. Bratton (2007) finds positive CAR's in the first three
days around the announcement of a block purchase. Brav et al. (2008) show large
positive average abnormal returns between 5% and 7% during the announcement
window. Finally, Clifford (2008) finds excess returns of 3.39% after announcement of
the 13D filing.
Mixed results are also found when examining other studies looking at proxy
resolutions filed by multiple types of activists. Renneboog and Szilagyi's (2006) study of
2,800 proxy resolutions and Del Guercio et al.'s (2008) "just vote no" proxy resolution
study both found small positive CARs upon announcement that a proxy resolution had
been filed. However, Prevost et al. (2009) find no short term returns upon announcement
of a proxy filing by labor unions.
Impacts on Long-term Market-based Firm Performance. Examining the
studies that consider market-based performance of a year or longer, again the findings are
largely equivocal. Again, all the studies were US-based unless otherwise noted. Three
studies looking at the impact of shareholder resolutions by all types of investors generally
find no impact on stock price. Karpoff et al. (1996) and Thomas et al. (2005) both find
no change in shareholder returns as a result of proxy resolutions issued. While Gillan and
Starks (2000) find no short-term impact on stock price, they report positive one-year
share returns as result of proxy resolutions issued. Their sample consisted of 2,042 proxy
resolutions submitted at 451 US companies from 1987 to 1994. Buchanan and Yang
(2009) report positive one year stock returns for their US sample of proxy resolutions.
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Only one study examined market-based performance over longer periods. Opler
and Sobokin (1998) examined shareholder activism efforts of the Council of Institutional
Investors and found that they were able to generate a positive one year average share
returns of 11.6%.
On the other hand, researchers studying blockholder activists report positive gains
using market-based performance measures. Bethel et al. (1998) show short-term stock
gains. Croci (2007), examining blockholder activists in Europe, finds that these activists
were able to generate positive long-term gains. Furthermore, when these activists sell
their stakes, they see better results when they have smaller ownership shares in these
companies.
Looking at pension funds, the results are once again equivocal. Four studies
report no evidence of changes in shareholder value in either the short or long term
(Wahal, 1996; Smith, 1996; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Faccio & Lasfer, 2000).
An examination of the studies on the CalPERS pension fund shows the findings
are mixed. Smith (1996) finds no impact on shareholder value in the short or long term
based on his sample of 51 firms targeted by CalPERS from 1987 to 1993. Yet, other
researchers focusing on the CalPERS pension fund report positive gains in shareholder
value. Nesbitt (1994) examined 42 investments made by CalPERS from 1987 to 1992
and found market based performance increases of 41%. In addition, Anson et al. (2003)
show significant returns of 59% in the year following the release of the CalPERS list of
targeted firms. Their sample includes firms placed on the focus list from 1992 to 2001.
More recently, Barber (2006) examined a sample of 115 firms from 1990 to 2005 that
were placed on the CalPERS target list and his results show both short-term and long-
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term market-based gains. While short-term gains were small but significant, five-year
gains outperformed the market by 32%.
Finally, research on hedge fund activism also report inconclusive market-based
performance effects. Klein and Zur (2006) find a decline in earnings-per-share one year
after the purchase of 5% equity stake by hedge funds. On the other hand, Boy son and
Mooradian (2007) and Bessler et al. (2008) find both positive by hedge funds on both
short and long-term market-based performance.
Impacts on Accounting-based Firm Performance. While most studies have
focused on market-based measures of performance, a few studies have looked at
accounting-based measures of performance as indicators of the effects of shareholder
activism. Typically, accounting-based performance is based on annual figures. Overall,
the results are mixed.
In their study of activist blockholders, Bethel et al. (1998) find long-term gains in
ROA three years after blockholder activists in the 1980's purchased a 5% or larger equity
stake.

Two studies looking at pension fund performance find no evidence of changes in

accounting-based performance measures (Wahal 1996; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999).
The findings on performance effects of hedge fund activism are also mixed.
Klein and Zur (2006) report declines in both ROA and ROE one year after the 5% equity
stake purchase. However, two studies found positive results. First, Brav et al. (2008)
find that firms targeted by hedge funds see increases in ROE and ROA. Second, Clifford
(2008) reports a large positive increase of 1.22% in ROA in the year following the
acquisition.
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Studies of Shareholder Activism Outside the US.
There are just a handful of studies focusing on shareholder activism in settings
outside of the United States. Many are descriptive in nature (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000;
Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008) or are case
studies (Hernandez-Lopez, 2003; Kruse, 2007; Anderson et al., 2007; Hendry et al.,
2007). Four studies are noteworthy. First, Croci (2007) examines blockholder activist
activity in Europe from 1990-2001 and finds that blockholder activists see higher returns
when they have smaller ownership stakes. Second, Faccio and Lasfers (2000) examine
the monitoring capability of UK pension funds and they conclude that UK pension funds
have been ineffective monitors. Third, Becht et al. (2009) conduct an in-depth case study
of the Hermes Focus Fund UK, a UK-based investment fund that engages in shareholder
activism. They tracked 41 investments made by the fund and had access to the
company's management and internal documents. Their findings show improvements in
operating returns and top management team turnover as a result of shareholder activism
efforts. Finally, Buchanan and Yang (2009) track US and UK shareholder proposals
from 2000 to 2006 (3,812 proposals at 764 US firms and 508 proposals at 85 UK firms).
They show one year stock price gains in the US sample, but not the UK sample. One
possibility for this result is the small sample size.
Summary of the Literature on Shareholder Activism
Based on the review of the literature in the prior section, several important points
can be raised. First, most of the prior literature on shareholder activism has been driven
by the finance and legal disciplines and is lacking an overarching theoretical foundation
to explain the antecedents and effects of shareholder activism other than agency theory,
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which has received modest empirical support. Thus, future research needs to utilize
multiple theoretical perspectives in order to develop and test a theory explaining the
causes and effects of shareholder activism.
Second, the bulk of the studies are based on US shareholder activism. Very little
is known about activism in other countries. There is much opportunity to learn about
shareholder activism in other countries. Specifically, no one has compared the impact of
governance environments on either the incidence and/or effects of shareholder activism.
Future work needs to determine whether governance environments impact the level of
shareholder activism experienced by firms and whether governance environments have
any impact on the effects of shareholder activism.
Third, the results of examining the effects of shareholder activism are also largely
equivocal. The bulk of studies concentrate on measuring short-term market-based
performance effects upon the announcement of an activism effort. There are very few
studies on the longer term impact of shareholder activism using accounting and marketbased measures, and their results are mixed. More studies are needed to measure the
longer term impact of shareholder activism on firm performance measures.
Fourth, there may be methodological problems which are clouding results of
shareholder activism studies. For example, many of the empirical studies are descriptive
in nature. More sophisticated statistical models would add much to the validity and
reliability of the results. A more comprehensive approach to the study of shareholder
activism is warranted. Additionally, some studies suffer from methodological problems.
For example, many other studies that calculate CAR's use vastly different empirical
methods to calculate return. Nelson (2006) argues that four prior studies examining
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shareholder returns around the release of the CalPERS focus list had methodology
problems which severely impact their results. Thus, this suggests the need for more
refined measurement models of shareholder activism.
Third, there are two types of shareholder activism and previous studies may not
have clearly delineated between financially driven shareholder activism and sociallydriven shareholder activism. A large portion of proxy resolutions have initiatives that
center on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, some pension funds put
pressure on target firms to improve their CSR practices. Thus, studies attempting to
measure financially related effects of shareholder activism may not find any impact on
the financial performance or corporate governance measures due to the presence of
socially driven shareholder activism. For example, Woidke (2002) finds that privately
owned pension funds are more focused on performance while publicly owned pension
funds are more focused on social issues. Finally, many studies used matched pair
samples comparing one firm that is experiencing shareholder activism to another similar
firm that is not being targeted for shareholder activism. Methodologically, it may be
more appropriate to conduct a larger scale study instead of just utilizing a matched pair
sample.
In summary, a large scale study on shareholder activism using multiple theoretical
perspectives is needed to synthesize the prior literature and provide guidance for future
research. In the next section, a new research model of shareholder activism is introduced
utilizing principal-agency and principal-principal perspectives.
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Theoretical Foundations of Shareholder Activism
The underlying theoretical foundation in the study of shareholder activism so far
is agency theory. The central tenet of agency theory is an overarching concern about the
divergence of interests between principals and agents (Berle & Means, 1932; Jenson &
Meckling, 1976). However, agency theory fails to explain the potential conflicts of
interests between shareholders. FDSA's may have different objectives for their target
firms than other shareholders. Thus, the principal-agent and principal-principal
perspectives are both used to determine what is driving financially driven shareholder
activism in the US and the UKPrincipal-Agent Perspective
Turning first to agency theory, Berle and Means (1932) laid the foundations for
future work in agency theory when they identified the problems that could occur when
ownership of the firm is separated from the control of the firm. Berle and Means (1932)
trace the growth of the American corporation from a single proprietorship to a public
corporation and suggest that this new structure was likely to give rise to problems of
ownership and control. In that transition, control of the corporation is placed in the hands
of professional managers who have little or no ownership interest. As a result, there is
the fear that managers may be acting in their own self-interest instead of the interests of
the corporation. Thus, opportunistic managerial decision-making could adversely impact
company performance.
The presumption of opportunistic behavior by managers gave rise to agency
theory, which was further enhanced by the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Fama and Jenson (1983) who posit that managers may misuse corporate assets for their
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own personal benefit, at the expense of shareholders, causing principal-agent issues.
Thus, agency costs can diminish corporate performance. As a result, agency theory logic
would suggest that shareholder activism is one external control option for owners who
are dissatisfied with the management of their assets.
The first line of defense against managerial opportunism is a board of directors
who closely monitor the activities of the top management team. The rise of shareholder
activism may be in part due to the failure of the board of directors to monitor and
discipline top management. The board of directors also has the responsibility of hiring
and firing the top management team and overseeing the strategic direction of the firm.
Boards are also the legal representatives of the owners of the corporation, although the
legal responsibility of directors to shareholders can vary by country (Huse & Rindova,
2001).
Some argue that the board of directors has not done a good job in their role as
monitor and failed to remove underperforming executives (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989;
Mace, 1986; Weisbach, 1988). In addition, Jensen and Smith (1985) argue that managers
are more likely to minimize risk, engage in short-term investments and employee growth
strategies to increase their compensation as well as their job security. Thus, the lack of
internal control mechanisms may lead to the rise of non-traditional external control
mechanisms like shareholder activism. As such, shareholder activism can serve as a
"substitute" governance mechanism for internal controls.
If the board of directors can't monitor the top management team effectively,
shareholders will be dissatisfied with both management (and perhaps the board as well).
Shareholders have three options: (1) sell their shares, (2) continue to hold their shares and
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attempt to influence the firm, or (3) passively continue to hold their shares in the hope
that things will improve over time. Clearly, option two is the path chosen by shareholder
activists in economies where capital markets are relatively liquid. However, activism is
not costless and only shareholders with the knowledge and resources can attempt to
"voice" their displeasure with underperforming corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;
Admati et al., 1994).
While agency theory is the theoretical basis almost all of the previous research on
shareholder activism, its explanatory power is increasingly being challenged. Firms may
be faced with not only principal-agent problems but also principal-principal problems.
Principal-Principal Perspective
Jiang and Peng (2010: 2) define principal-principal problems as "conflicts
between two groups of principals: controlling shareholders and minority shareholders."
Su, Xu and Phan, (2008: 17-18) expand this definition by stating that principal-principal
problems refer to "the appropriation of value from minority shareholders by majority
shareholders, often by influencing board level decisions such as asset sales and
purchases." Nonetheless, principal-principal problems have been primarily studied in the
context of emerging economies (Dharwadkar, George & Brandes, 2000; Su, Xu & Phan,
2008; Jiang & Peng, 2010; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Chen & Young, 2010; Peng &
Jiang, 2010).
Furthermore, Su et al. (2008:21) note the following:
Principals cannot be treated as a single entity with common interests.
Owners diverge in their preferences for risk and returns, their private costs
of monitoring and their strategic motivations for investing in a company.
Moreover, owners who are in a better position to exert direct pressure in
the boardroom, such as state representatives with political authority,
institutional investors with large holdings and employees with the threat of
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industrial action, can enhance their parochial interests at the expense of a
subgroup of owners who do not have similar levels of influence.
As shareholder activism is a mechanism for shareholders to put pressure on firm
management, it empowers shareholders to push for changes within the firm.
Furthermore, with the growth of institutional investors in developed countries like the US
and UK, it is important to rethink the assumption that principal-principal problems only
occur in emerging markets.
Research using the principal-principal perspective is still in its infancy, with
researchers such as Young et al. (2008) issuing a call for additional studies on principalprincipal conflicts. Evidence suggests that the growth of the hedge fund industry has
created a group of investors who aggressively seek out firms that have resources to
extract. Prior research has found that hedge funds target cash-rich (Klein & Zur, 2006;
Bratton, 2007; Brav et al., 2009) high-performing firms (Klein & Zur, 2006; Brav et al.,
2009) with the short term goal of higher dividend payouts, gains through asset sales and
short term increases in stock price.
Thus, this paper develops a competing hypothesis in order to determine whether
the motive of shareholder activism to curb agency problems within the firm through
increased monitoring, or whether the motive of shareholder activism is resource
extraction by dominant shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus,
under the principal-agent perspective, the objective of shareholder activism would be to
take care of problems that exist within the target firm. In contrast, under the principalprincipal perspective, the objective of shareholder activism would be to benefit from
problems that exist within the firm. In summary, the competing hypotheses perspective
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asks whether financially driven shareholder activists are acting as "police" or as "looters"
of the firm.
Model of Shareholder Activism
Based on the prior literature and original research questions, a model of
antecedents and effects of shareholder activism is introduced. As seen in Figure 1, there
are four main components to the model: presence of financially driven shareholder
activism in the company, antecedents or predictors of FDSA, performance outcomes of
FDSA and the impact of a moderator to influence the FDSA-performance relationship.
Two competing theories are tested: principal-agent and principal-principal.

FIGURE 1 - RESEARCH MODEL
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Previous research on shareholder activism is extended with the inclusion of new
antecedents, moderators, and improvements to the methodology, which will be discussed
in Chapter III.
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In the earlier literature review, the mixed findings of many studies may have been
clouded because the researchers did not differentiate from the two main types of
shareholder activism: financially driven and socially driven. This is especially true in
studies examining proxy resolutions. Judge et al. (2010) note that there appear to be two
types of shareholder activism. First, there is financially driven shareholder activism,
where the motives of activism are to improve the firm's performance. A second type of
shareholder activism has begun to garner much attention is more socially driven
shareholder activism that is focused on environmental concerns or employee welfare. As
this study will attempt to capture the impact of shareholder activism on financial
performance, it is important to focus entirely on financially driven shareholder activism
and not include socially driven activism.
Hypothesis Development
Antecedents
Examining the antecedents of activism, this study tests whether the drivers of
FDSA are due to principal-agent or principal-principal problems within the target firm.
Three hypotheses are developed to test each competing perspective. First turning to
principal-agent drivers of FDSA, this study looks at whether the makeup of the board of
directors may lead the company to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activists
due to principal-agent problems within the firms that are the result of poor board
monitoring. The model includes variables such as board independence, outside director
busyness and CEO duality. Three competing principal-principal drivers of FDSA focus
on firm characteristics that would lead a FDSA to target a firm with the objective of
extracting resources from the firm. The model includes three variables to proxy
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principal-principal problems: debt levels, blockholder ownership and pressure resistance
of the dominant owner. Drawing on the literature and considering insights from
principal-agent and principal-principal perspectives, this study will determine which
competing perspective does a better job in explaining the presence of FDSA.
Principal-Agent Drivers of FDSA
The board of directors plays an important role as the fulcrum between
shareholders and managers. The board of directors for a firm was first created when
firms began to grow in size and incorporate. With the incorporation of companies, firms
grew too big to be owned and managed by a single person (Berle & Means, 1932). This
led to the advent of the modern corporation with owners becoming principles of the firm
and contracting agents or executives to manage the day-to-day operations of the firm.
From an agency theory perspective, one key role of a board is to act on the behalf of
owners to monitor the firm's managers. Shareholder activism is a mechanism to express
dissatisfaction with the firm or the board of directors. In this section, it is argued that
board of director characteristics may be signals to shareholders that the firm's governance
practices may be lacking. Furthermore, board issues may lead a firm to be less equipped
to handle the complex problems that a firm faces. Using agency theory logic, it is argued
that board independence, outside director busyness and CEO duality, are important
factors that could be leading to increased levels of shareholder activism.
Board Independence. Agency theory suggests that board independence is an
important factor that will lead to more effective monitoring of management and is
included in the study as a predictor of FDSA. Board members can be comprised of
insiders, who are currently employed or have been employed by the company, and
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outsiders, who have no ties to the firm or its executives. Board independence refers to
the ratio of outsiders to insiders; the more outsiders that make up the board, the more
independent the board.
Relatively little is known about how board independence may trigger shareholder
activism. However, agency theory predicts that inadequate board monitoring will invite
managerial opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and this could lead to
shareholder activism. The literature on board composition is vast and empirical results
from the studies are largely equivocal. However, some studies find that a high number of
outsiders on the board can be detrimental to the firm. Westphal and Bednar (2005) find
that outside directors having low friendship ties and differences in functional
backgrounds lead to pluralistic ignorance and create strategic persistence in the firm.
Mace (1986) finds that the cognitive diversity of outside board members can negatively
impact a board member's commitment to the board. Others find that high levels of
outsiders increase group conflict (Kor, 2006; Milliken & Martins, 1996). Zahra (1996)
found empirical support that outside directors can negatively impact a firm's
entrepreneurship activities.
A core agency theory argument is that boards are set up to monitor company
executives and protect shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, Fama (1980)
argues that it is crucial to have outside directors to monitor managers. A number of
studies have shown that boards with a majority of outside directors are more effective in
overseeing management (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Byrd &
Hickman, 1992; Morck & Nakamura, 1994; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Bhagat & Black,
2002). Outside directors have been found to have different motivations than inside
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directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that outside directors have their personal
reputations at stake, which is an added incentive to be effective board directors.
Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) found that a vigilant board which consisted of a majority
of outside directors is positively related to firm performance. Numerous studies have
found that outsiders are more likely to have CEOs fired for poor financial performance
(Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts & Wruck, 1988).
Furthermore, codes of governance have suggested that boards should have
independent directors. In the UK, the Cadbury Report of 1992 recommended that firms
should have a balanced board with at a least three independent, non-executive directors.
In 2008, the British code stated that at least 50% of the board, excluding the chair, should
have independent non-executive directors.
Using agency theory logic, outside directors will be more vigilant and not have
the same conflict of interest issues that inside board members may have. If shareholders
feel that a firm's board is acting in the best interest of the firm, they will be less likely to
target a firm for shareholder activism. Thus, it is hypothesized that boards with a larger
percentage of outside directors will face less shareholder activism due to the limited
opportunity for managerial opportunism.
Hypothesis 1: The board of director's level of independence of the target
firm will be negatively associated with FDSA.
Outside Director Busyness. The second principal-agent predictor of FDSA is
outside director busyness, which refers to board directors who hold multiple board seats
in various firms (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003). There are two schools of
thought about multiple directorships. First, from a resource dependency perspective,
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directors who belong to multiple boards have extensive outside contacts and can work to
solidify relationships with customers or suppliers (Ghosh, 2007). The argument is that
the better the director, the more popular they will be, and the more invitations they will
receive to join multiple boards. Mace (1986) argues that outside directors can provide
the firm with prestige, contacts, and enhanced visibility. Carpenter and Westphal (2001)
find that board members with multiple directorships add value by providing a significant
amount of expertise. There is some empirical evidence to support the resource
dependency perspective linking multiple board appointments with firm performance
(Brown & Maloney, 1999; Ferris, et al., 2003; Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Miwa &
Ramseyer, 2000).
On the other hand, agency theorists suggest that multiple board appointments can
adversely affect the board's monitoring capabilities as directors become overcommitted.
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that decision quality suffers due to the lack of time to
devote to board duties. Furthermore, two groups, the National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD) and the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), have recommended
placing limits on a number of board appointments an individual should accept. NACD
suggests that individuals holding senior corporate executive positions should accept no
more than three board appointments while the CII recommends that individuals holding
full-time jobs be limited to no more than two board appointments. There is some
empirical evidence to support the agency perspective. Core, Holthausen and Larcker
(1999) find a positive relationship between director busyness and excessive CEO
compensation. Others find a negative relationship between the number of outside board
seats and firm performance. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that busy
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boards have a 4.2% lower book to market ratio, lower operating ROA, lower asset
turnover ratios, and lower operating return on sales. They also point out methodological
problems with the Ferris et al. (2003) study which finds a positive relationship between
busy boards and firm performance. Jackling and Johl (2009) also find a negative
relationship between multiple directorships and firm performance in a sample of Indian
firms. Finally, Jiraporn, Singh and Lee (2009) find that firms with multiple directorships
tend to be more diversified and are more likely to suffer from diversification discount
issues (Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002).
As shareholder activism may be driven by agency problems within the firm, and a
firm with a busy board signifies that boards may not be in the best position to monitor the
firm, outside director busyness may be a key antecedent of financially driven shareholder
activism. Thus, the next hypothesis is offered.
Hypothesis 2: The level of outside director busyness of the target firm is
positively associated with FDSA.
CEO duality. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agents, or executives of
the firm, are self-serving, driven to maximize their own utility and will do so at the
expense of performance of the company. Thus, the board of directors plays an important
role as the watchdog for the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). One major debate has
centered around whether a firm benefits by having the same person hold dual roles of
both the chairperson and chief executive officer (CEO). The chairperson heads the group
of board of directors. Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994:1087) suggest that having the same
person occupy both positions "conveys a sense of unity of command and strong
leadership to stakeholders." On the other hand, there may be a conflict of interest when

54

the Chairperson is also the CEO (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Fizel & Louie, 1990;
Daynton, 1984). Furthermore, Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that a CEO who is
also the Chairperson of the board may be more likely to select board members who will
not challenge him/her.
There is little empirical evidence to predict how the existence of CEO duality will
impact the level of shareholder activism. Principal-agent problems may be exacerbated
due to the increased power of the CEO who also has the chairperson role. Occupying
both CEO and Chair roles would make a person more likely to misuse his or her power
and make decisions that benefit him/herself. Thus, using the principal-agent perspective,
it is argued that firms with CEO duality would be more likely to be targeted by
financially driven shareholder activists. This leads to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The existence of CEO duality in a target firm will be positively
associated with FDSA.

Principal-principal problems as drivers of FDSA.
In this section, three hypotheses are introduced to test whether principal-principal
problems may be driving FDSA. Under this perspective, FDSA is a mechanism to
benefit from problems in the target firm. While the principal-principal perspective has
previously been tested within emerging markets, this study examines whether the
motivation of FDSA is resource extraction. There is anecdotal evidence that some
shareholder activists such as hedge funds act like wolves in sheep's clothing (Kupla,
2005). The first hypothesis looks at the firm's debt levels and how debt levels create
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increased potential for expropriation. The next two hypotheses examine how the
ownership structure of the firm creates opportunities for FDSAs to expropriate resources.
Debt level. According to classic agency theory, debt acts as a mechanism to alleviate
agency problems (Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that
firm managers would rather use debt instead of equity as a strategy to avoid monitoring.
Using the principal-agent perspective, it can be argued that high debt levels in a firm
reduce free cash flow available to managers, which in turn reduces managerial discretion
(Jensen, 1986). High levels of debt act as an additional monitoring mechanism, thus
negating the need for shareholder activism. Thus, the principal-agent perspective would
suggest a positive relationship between debt and FDS A.
However, using principal-principal logic, the opposite relationship is argued.
Young et al. (2008) suggest that principal-principal conflicts are the result of institutional
environments that pit dominant owners against minority owners. From a principalprincipal perspective, higher debt levels reduce the potential for expropriation, as cash
flow is committed to covering existing debt payments (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001).
Within this perspective, shareholder activists are expected to target firms that have high
potential for resource extraction. Therefore, firms with low debt levels would be
attractive to shareholder activists because they can demand that firms increase their debt
to asset loads, thus increasing the potential for increased payouts to shareholders. Thus,
according to the principal-principal perspective, FDSAs would target firms with low debt
as they have extractable resources that can be exploited to benefit their own position.
This leads to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The debt level of the target firm is negatively associated with FDSA.
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Stockholder ownership. Ownership by large shareholders, or blockholders, has
been examined in the literature with mixed results. In addition, blockholder ownership
has been a focus in corporate governance, but it has not been extensively investigated in
the shareholder activism literature. The traditional agency-principal perspective would
suggest that dominant shareholders can play an active role as monitors of the firm. It is
known that as owners increase their stakes in a firm, the incentive to monitor increases
(Shleifer&Vishny, 1986).
However, Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) point out in their metaanalysis that the empirical evidence supporting agency theory is inconclusive with
respect to earnings management. Instead, they suggest that the existence of blockholder
ownership can lead to additional problems within the firm. Clifford (2003) points out
that blockholder owners can also engage in resource consumption. Morck, Wolfenzon
and Yeung (2005) argue that concentrated ownership can cause additional problems if
there is a misalignment of interests between the dominant shareholders and the minority
shareholders.
Furthermore, previous research suggests that blockholders are able to institute
changes within the firm. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (forthcoming) show that existing
blockholders have been able to influence investment, financial and executive
policymaking in their firms. Denis and Serrano (1996) find that blockholders are able to
remove top managers after failed takeover attempts.
While prior research has examined the role of blockholder ownership and
corporate governance, little research has been done on the impact of blockholder
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ownership on the incidence of FDSA. Jiang and Peng (2010:4) suggest that "having
multiple blockholders, rather than having just a single controlling shareholder, may be a
useful internal mechanism to solve potentially devastating principal-principal problems."
Furthermore, Bethel et al. (1998) refer to blockholder investments as the market for
partial corporate control. If a firm is already under a "partial corporate control" by
existing blockholders, FDSAs would see no potential in additional activism efforts.
Under the principal-principal perspective, FDSAs target firms in the hopes of
being able to push for changes within the firm that will benefit their own stakes at the
expense of minority shareholders. If there already are a significant number of
blockholders in the firm, it sends a signal that this company is already being impacted by
dominant shareholders. Indeed, there is some preliminary empirical evidence to support
the view of blockholder ownership preventing FDSA. Judge et al. (2010) find empirical
support that a target firm's ownership concentration is negatively related with financially
driven shareholder activism. Thus, using a principal-principal perspective, the level of
blockholder ownership will have a negative relationship with FDSA. More formally
stated:
Hypothesis 5: The degree of blockholder ownership for the target firm is negatively
related to FDSA.

Pressure resistance of the dominant owner. Round (1976) argues that
ownership structure can be described by both ownership concentration and type of
ownership. Brickley et al. (1988) and others find that not all institutional investors are

58
alike. Indeed, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) argue that ownership concentration may not
matter as much as the type of owner or the level of control that top owners have.
Researchers have used three typologies to classify owners within a firm. First,
some have used insider control versus outsider control (Cubbin & Leech, 1983) where
banks and holding companies make up insider controlled owners and institutional
investors with broad holdings such as pension funds comprise outsider control. Second,
Gerlach (1992) introduced a typology that included three owner groups: insiders, stable
investors and market investors. Insiders have a substantial equity stake but also hold a
managerial role within the company. Stable investors are those that maintain other ties to
the firm (such as banks, suppliers or alliance partner) and whose investment objective of
profit maximization takes a secondary role behind maintaining the multi-faceted
relationship. Market investors are those investors whose goal is to maximize shareholder
return.
Brickley et al. (1988) introduce a third typology consisting of pressure sensitive,
pressure insensitive and pressure indeterminate owners. First, pressure sensitive
investors are ones who may be influenced by the target firm's managers and may be less
likely to influence the firm's actions. For example, many insurance companies, banks
and mutual funds also have these firms as their own clients and may be reluctant to push
for change for fear that it may harm their client relationship. In addition, when the top
owner is an insider, they would also be fall under the pressure sensitive category. Second,
pressure resistant institutional investors are those who do not have conflict of interest
with their target firms and thus could be more likely to be active monitors of a firm.
Hedge funds are a good example of a pressure resistant institutional investor. The third
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category is pressure indeterminate investors and it is not clear whether they have the
inclination to engage in monitoring their firms.
Empirical work using the Brickley et al. (1998) typology have found that
evidence that institutional owners are distinctly different in how they monitor their
investments. In their study of anti-takeover amendments, Brickley et al. (1988) find that
pressure sensitive institutional investors were more likely to vote with management,
while pressure resistant investors were more likely to vote against management. Hartzell
and Starks (2003) show that firms with pressure resistant owners have lower executive
compensation packages than firms with pressure sensitive owners. Furthermore, Denis
and Denis (1995) find that top management turnover after declines in performance is
more likely to occur when pushed by pressure resistant blockholders. Finally, David,
Kochhar and Levitas (1998) find empirical support that pressure resistant owners are
more likely to impact CEO compensation. Conversely, if a FDSA targets a firm that has
a pressure sensitive dominant owner, it may be assumed that the dominant owner may be
entrenched with top management (Brickley et al., 1988).
Using principal-principal logic, there is less opportunity for expropriation if the
dominant owner is pressure sensitive. From a principal-principal perspective, FDSAs
would rather target a firm that has a pressure resistant top owner as the top owner is not
entrenched with management. Thus, it will be more likely that demands from FDSAs
will be considered and met. Conversely, if the firm's dominant owner is pressure
sensitive, its conflict of interest will prevent it from pushing management for changes.
Thus, it is hypothesized that FDSAs will target firms with a dominant pressure resistant

60
top owner because it will be easier to push for change within the firm. More formally
stated:
Hypothesis 6: The presence of a pressure resistant dominant owner in a target firm
is positively associated with FDSA.

Effects of Financially Driven Shareholder Activism
The second research question of this study focuses on the long-term effects of
financially driven shareholder activism. The research model examines the effect of
shareholder activism on long-term changes in firm performance. With such mixed results
on studies examining the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, it is
appropriate to introduce competing hypotheses using both principal-agent and principalprincipal perspectives.
Principal-agent perspective and changes in firm performance
There is evidence of a positive relationship between shareholder activism and
firm performance. Nesbitt (1994) found positive increases in market-based performance
of 41% in his study of shareholder activism by the CalPERs pension fund. Anson et al.
(2003; 2004) show both short and long term market based returns after CalPERS released
their list of targeted firms. Barber (2006) finds that CalPERS is able to generate both
short-term market-based gains and long-term market-based gains over 5 years for firms
placed on their target list.
Strickland et al. (1996) show positive CARs after activism by the US Shareholder
Association. Opler and Sokobin (1998) show that the Council on Institutional Investors
generated market-based returns of 11.6% after they made their target list of firms public.
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Boyson and Mooradian (2007) find both short-term market-based gains as well as
long term accounting-based performance increases as a result of hedge fund activism.
Bratton (2007) also finds short term market-based gains as a result of activism efforts by
hedge funds. Brav et al. (2009) and Clifford (2008) find both short term market-based
gains and long-term accounting based increases in performance as a result of hedge fund
activism.
Monks and Minow (1996) suggest that shareholder activism can be a powerful
force for corporate governance. Shareholders who perceive that firms are being
mismanaged can use shareholder activism tactics to voice their displeasure and try to
institute change within the firm. It can be argued that shareholder activism is another
monitoring device to address agency problems within the firm. From an agency theory
perspective, the presence of shareholder activism should increase the level of monitoring
of the firm. Increased monitoring should curb agency problems and lead to increased
firm performance. Following previous empirical evidence and principal-agency logic,
there should be a positive relationship between FDSA and subsequent firm performance.
More formally stated:
Hypothesis 7a: FDSA is positively associated with subsequent changes in
long-term financial performance of the target firm.

Principal-principal perspective and changes in firm performance
On the other hand, there's a body of research that suggests that shareholder
activism has either no impact or a negative impact on target firms. A number of studies
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find no changes in firm performance after shareholder activism (Karpoff et al., 1996;
Wahal, 1996; Black, 1998; Romano, 2001). Klein and Zur (2006) report declines in EPS,
ROA and ROE one year after the 13D filings by hedge fund activists. Prevost and Rao
(2000) show negative returns after proxy mailings in their sample of pension fund
activism.
According to the principal-principal perspective, FDSA is a mechanism for
shareholder activists to profit from their investments to the longer term detriment of the
target firm. Other studies have found that firms targeted by shareholder activists
experienced increased sales of assets (Bethel et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999;
Greenwood & Schor, 2007), increased employee layoffs (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999)
and increased cash payouts (Bratton, 2007). Bethel et al. (1998) suggest that shareholder
activists may have different sets of objectives when targeting firms. There is some
evidence that not all activists are alike and that some activists are more aggressive in their
quest for short-term gains. Specifically, hedge funds and blockholder activists have been
known for being more aggressive activists than pension funds and individual investors.
Just as owners have divergent interests and objectives (Su et al., 2008), some
activists could also have the goal of expropriation, defined as "the disproportional sharing
of gains (or losses) among different shareholders" (Faccio & Stolin, 2006:1416).
Shareholder activists like hedge funds and blockholders are increasing pressure to deliver
short-term results via asset sales and increased cash payouts, while other investors are
more interested in long term results. Some activist hedge funds have been described as
the "newest version of Wall Street wolves, always poised to attack new companies while
claiming to be acting in shareholder's best interests by operating under a cloak of
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shareholder clothing" (Kulpa, 2005: 78). Furthermore, Kulpa (2005) contends that hedge
funds use sophisticated gaming models to take advantage of shareholder voting as well as
engaging in "wolf pack" maneuvers where these unregulated financial instruments band
together to confront management. Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that hedge funds' quest
for short-term profits may lead to longer-term problems for their shareholder activism
targets.
Based on the idea that not all owners have the same investment objectives and
some shareholder activists may be extremely powerful shareholders with the potential for
expropriation, the principal-principal perspective would suggest that FDSA leads to
negative changes in firm performance. This leads to the corollary of Hypothesis 7a:
Hypothesis 7b: FDSA is negatively associated with subsequent changes in long-term
financial performance for the target firm.

The Moderating Role of Governance Environment
Given the mixed empirical results of the impact of shareholder activism on firm
performance, there is a need to examine whether there could be moderators influencing
the relationship between FDSA and long-term firm performance. Thus, two competing
hypotheses are developed using logic from the principal-agent and principal-principal
perspectives.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggest that
governance environments differ between countries. Even though the US and the UK
have Anglo-American governance systems, their respective regulatory environments
have evolved in unique ways. Overall, US shareholders do not have the same level of
rights that UK shareholders do. The UK started its reform governance reform efforts in
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1992 with the Cadbury Report, which advocated the separation of the chair and CEO
positions as well as stipulating that there should be three or more independent nonexecutive directors. On the other hand, the US did not institute governance reform until
10 years later in 2002 with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
UK shareholders have significant powers that US shareholders do not. First,
shareholders in the UK are able to call special meetings with as little as 10% of the vote.
Second, UK shareholders can replace board members at any time if they get a majority
vote. Third, in the UK, proxy resolutions are binding. In contrast, US shareholders have
one opportunity every year to introduce a shareholder resolution during the annual
shareholders meeting. Furthermore, it is difficult and expensive to introduce a proxy
resolution. US shareholders do not have the power to replace board members as the
proxy votes are nonbinding. Thus, even if the majority of shareholders vote to remove a
director, the company does not need to act on it. Similarly, board members can be reelected without a majority vote.
The UK has been refining its governance mechanisms with numerous non-binding
recommendations via the Greenbury Report (1995) which focused on executive
compensation, the Hampel Report (1998) which combined the Greenbury and Cadbury
reports, the Turnbull Report (1999) which focused on internal controls and risk, and the
Higgs Review (2003), which redefined board independence. All of these are non-binding
resolutions that have been voluntarily adopted by a large number of companies in the
UK. Although these resolutions are nonbinding, UK companies must report whether they
are in compliance with the code.
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Principal-Agent Prediction
Using the principal-agent perspective, shareholder activism is a tool to increase
the level of monitoring in a firm. Increased monitoring should lead to positive changes in
firm performance. Aguilera et al. (2006) argue that UK shareholder activism is much
different than US shareholder activism. First, as shareholders in the UK have established
methods to voice dissatisfaction with firm management, they will be less inclined to
resort to public shareholder activism. Holland (1988) reports that institutional investors
have easy access to firm managers and directors and are able to meet with them regularly.
Second, the UK has more effective alternative governance mechanisms such as
Extraordinary General Meetings and binding shareholder resolutions, so that shareholders
of UK firms have other ways to express their dissatisfaction with firm management.
First, much shareholder activism in the UK is behind the scenes and out of the public eye
(Black and Coffee, 1994; Holland, 1998) and beyond the scope of this study. Last, with
so many governance mechanisms available to shareholders, shareholder activism in the
UK may be a "tool of last resort" only utilized when all other mechanisms fail. In the
UK, it is hypothesized that shareholder activism in the UK is not expected to be as
effective as activism in the US as it is directed at the worst offenders.
On the other hand, US shareholders do not have the same mechanisms to express
their dissatisfaction and use shareholder activism as their primary monitoring tool.
Shareholder activism is expected to be more effective in the US for several reasons. One,
shareholder activism is one of the few tools that shareholders have to express
dissatisfaction with firm management. Two, there is a long history of shareholder
activism in the US (Marens, 2002), and many activists like CalPERS and the Council of
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Institutional Investors (CII) effectively use the press to publicly chastise firms on their
target list (Wahal, 1996; Crutchley et al., 1998; Opler & Sokobin, 1998; Caton et al.,
2001; Song & Szewczyk, 2003; and others).
This follows that the effects of FDSA on firm performance will be moderated by
governance environment. Using principal-agent logic, it is hypothesized that greater
reliance in shareholder activism as a primary monitoring tool in the US will lead to
greater positive changes in financial performance than in the UK. Thus:
Hypothesis 8a: The governance environment will moderate the FDSA -firm
performance relationship. Specifically, the FDSA- firm performance relationship
will be stronger and more positive in the US than in the UK governance
environment due to moral hazard mitigation.

Principal-Principal Prediction
Using the principal-principal perspective, shareholder activism is a means to
expropriate resources from the company at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus,
firms operating in a governance environment with weaker protection of minority
shareholders should experience a more negative impact on firm performance as a result
of FDSA. There is some evidence to suggest that the UK provides more protection for
minority shareholders. First, Lele and Siems (2006) track shareholder protection in five
countries including the US and UK over 35 years. They find that UK had a higher level
of shareholder protection based on a 60 variable shareholder protection index. Second,
UK laws and governance codes empower smaller shareholders through EGMs and
increased disclosure requirements. Third, La Porta et al. (1997) state that the UK is a
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country that provides minority shareholders with strong rights. Fourth, Aguilera
(2005:42) goes even further by stating that the "UK is a pioneer and trend-setter in codes
of good governance." If the UK is known for having the best corporate governance, it
follows that governance codes will protect the smaller shareholder. If smaller
shareholders are being protected, it will be more difficult for larger shareholders to
engage in expropriation in the UK.
On the other hand, US shareholder laws discriminate against small investors,
creating an environment that is more conducive to expropriation by larger shareholders.
Compared to the UK, it is relatively expensive to engage in shareholder activism and
only larger organizations can do it, but only if they see the potential for a substantial
return (Admati et al., 1994). For example, Bob Monks spent over $1 million from his
personal wealth to engage in shareholder activism efforts against Sears (Monks &
Minow, 1996).
Using principal-principal logic, if FDSA is a mechanism to extract resources at
the expense of smaller shareholders, the expected FDSA-firm performance relationship
will be negative. However., in the UK, firm performance will be less negatively affected
than in the US due to its strong governance codes and protection of minority
shareholders. Conversely, in the US, firm performance will be more negatively affected
than in the UK due to its US governance practices that favor the large investor. More
formally stated:
Hypothesis 8b: The governance environment will moderate the FDSA- firm
performance relationship. Specifically, the FDSA-firm performance relationship
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will be stronger and more negative in the US than in the UK governance
environments due to expropriation problems.
Summary
In summary, a model of the antecedents and effects of shareholder activism was
developed. The model tests three principal-agency drivers and three principal-principal
drivers of shareholder activism. The model also examines the impact of FDSA on firm
performance and includes a moderator capturing the impact of governance environment
on the relationship between FDSA and changes in firm performance. Both principalagency and principal-principal perspectives were used to develop eight research
hypotheses.

Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses along with theoretical foundations, and

predicted relationships. In the next chapter, the methodology will be introduced with a
description of the research design, sample, operationalization of variables and the plan for
data analysis.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS

H#
THEORY
ANTECEDENTS
HI
P-A
H2
P-A
H3
P-A
H4
P-P
H5
P-P
H6
P-P

VARIABLE

PREDICTED
RELATIONSHIP

Independence
Outside Director Busyness
CEO Duality
Debt level
Blockholder ownership
Pressure Resistance of Dominant Owner

Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive

EFFECTS
H7a P-A
H7b P-P

FDSA
FDSA

Positive
Negative

MODERATORS
H8a P-A
H8b P-P

Governance Environment
Governance Environment

Stronger positive relationship in US
Stronger negative relationship in US
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study is to attain a better understanding of the antecedents and effects
of shareholder activism in the US and the UK via a longitudinal study. In this chapter,
the methodology used to carry out empirical testing of the research model described in
the previous chapter is described. The methodologies of previous studies in shareholder
activism are examined and discussed. Next, the research design is introduced with
descriptions of the sample, operationalization of all variables, and the statistical analyses
used to test the hypotheses that were introduced in the previous chapter.
Research design
In developing the research design for this study, a thorough examination of past
research was conducted. Kahan and Rock (2006) and others report that much shareholder
activism is behind closed doors and thus extremely difficult to measure. This study will
be limited to formal activism events while ignoring informal behind the scenes
discussions and dialogue.
Identifying shareholder activism is difficult and each method has weaknesses.
Researchers have used five major methods to identify incidences of shareholder activism
and study its effects. First, a large number of researchers studying US-based companies
have tracked proxy resolutions filed by different types of shareholder activists (Karpoff et
al., 1996; Wahal, 1996; Carleton et al., 1998; Johnson & Sheckell, 1997; Del Guercio &
Hawkins, 1999; Campbell, Gillan & Niden, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Schwab &
Thomas, 1998; Thomas & Martin, 1998; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Choi, 2000; Thomas et
al., 2005; Akyol & Carroll, 2006; Prevost et al., 2009). The primary weaknesses are that
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proxy resolutions are non-binding and are just one mechanism of shareholder activism
utilized by activists. Second, other researchers studying activism in US firms have
identified shareholder activism via the SEC schedule 13D, which is required when
companies purchase a 5% or greater stake in the company (Boyson & Mooradian, 2007;
Bratton, 2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008). A
limitation of this method is that shareholder activists who don't make block purchases are
excluded from analysis. In addition, reliance on the schedule 13D form limits researchers
from expanding to multiple country samples.
Third, others have worked with a specific activist and gained access to internal
records. Becht et al. (2009) were able to follow the internal workings of the Hermes UK
Focus Fund and its activism strategies and effects, yet the study lacks generalizability due
to the small sample size. Fourth, others have done case studies. Hernandez-Lopez
(2003) did a case study of two firms' attempts to take over other firms in Europe. Kruse
(2007) examined the case of one firm (Olivetti) attempting to take over another (Telecom
Italia) in Italy. In addition, Anderson et al. (2007) examined shareholder activism in
Australia with a case study of four Australian unions. As with any case study, one runs
into problems of generalizability.
Finally, a few researchers have used content analysis of news stories to build a
database of shareholder activists and have tracked their activism efforts. Crutchley et al.
(1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and English et al. (2004) use the Wall Street
Journal to identify public announcements of the CalPERS pension fund releasing their
target list. Croci (2007) used national newspapers in Europe to identify a sample of
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corporate raiders and their targets for shareholder activism. Judge et al. (2010) use
Factiva to identify incidences of shareholder activism.
A challenge in any multi-country study is the availability of similar data for all the
countries in the study. Following Crutchley et al. (1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins
(1999), English et al. (2004) and Croci (2007), a sample of shareholder activists is
created from the examination of news stories. As there is no database that covers
shareholder activism in both the US and UK covering a long period of time, content
analysis using the Dow Jones Factiva database is used to uncover shareholder activism
events. Factiva provides comprehensive archival database of news reports from more
than 25,000 publications worldwide. Using the content analysis framework provided by
Neuendorf (2002), a codebook is created along with a coding form that two independent
coders used. The codebook can be found in Appendix A.
A search for the keyword term "shareholder activism" for each company was
conducted for the years 2000 through 2007. Two coders were used to code articles
containing shareholder activism and company name for the 187 firms in the sample. One
coder was the author and the other coder was a paid graduate student. Both coders noted
the date of the activism event, method of activism, goal of the activism, initiator of the
activism, and the outcome of the activism. The author was experienced in content
analysis. The graduate student was trained by first doing content analysis on five
companies to make sure he understood how to code an article. The graduate student was
also requested to cut and paste all the relevant details from the article into an Excel
spreadsheet for future reference. To check for inter-coder reliability, both coders
evaluated the same 60 companies. Results were compared and an inter-coder reliability
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of 92% was found, giving the study adequate inter-coder reliability. In addition,
following Judge et al. (2010), the activism event was later coded into two categories:
financially driven and non-financially driven activism. The literature divides activism by
two general goals: improvement of corporate social responsibility and improvement of
company performance. All activism events that are unrelated to corporate social
responsibility are labeled as financially driven shareholder activism.
Establishing the validity of the FDSA measure is difficult, as there are many
methods that shareholder activists used, including proxy resolutions, issuing public
reports or naming to focus lists, letters/meetings or dialogue with management, buying a
stake in the company, shareholder lawsuits, proxy fights and letters to SEC. In the
sample, the most common method used by FDSA was proxy resolutions. In order to test
the validity of the FDSA measure, a sample of 40 firm years was selected with 20 firm
years drawn from companies who were targeted by FDSA using proxy resolutions.
Another sample of 20 firm years was randomly drawn from the group of firm years that
was not targeted by any FDSA efforts. Proxy resolution data was only available on US
companies. Using the SEC database of schedule 14A filings, the incidence of FDSA
using proxy resolutions as the mechanism for shareholder activism was coded for the 40
firm years. Each shareholder resolution was examined and coded as 0/1 dummy variable
(with 1 having an FDSA related resolution) and also as a continuous count variable. Two
correlation analyses were conducted using the dummy and continuous variables.
Correlations were .629 and .611 for the dummy and continuous variables, respectively,
and those results are significant (p<.01). Thus, using content analysis to capture
incidence of FDSA is a valid measure.
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Sample
The other key decision besides creating a mechanism to identify shareholder
activism events is to create a sample of companies not targeted by shareholder activists in
which to make statistical comparisons. While many studies use primarily descriptive
statistics (see Kahan & Rock, 2006; Bratton, 2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Lewis &
Mackenzie, 2000), most of the studies relied on creating a matched pair sample in which
to make comparisons. Unfortunately, there is no uniformity in creating matched samples
in previous shareholder activism studies. Most use industry classifications as defined by
SIC code and some other measure. Some researchers used industry defined by 2-digit
SICs and selected a matched sample based on the company nearest in market
capitalization as measured by the book value of assets (Karpoff et al., 1996; Carleton et
al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Thomas et al., 2005). Smith (1996) used fourdigit SICs and the companies closest in sales revenue. According to Kerlinger and Lee
(2000), matched pair design has two major flaws. First, it is difficult to identify the most
pertinent match criteria. In the above studies, pairs were built matching on such criteria
as industry and total assets, market capitalization, and sales revenue. Second, the more
variables that a researcher tries to match, the more difficult it becomes to identify a
matched pair. As a result, the generalizability of a matched pair study is compromised
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).
This study uses an alternative to the matched pairs design approach. Following
Wu (2004), the top 100 firms in the US and the UK are selected because it is
methodologically superior to a matched-pairs design with a sample time frame of 20002007. Thus, the control firms consist of those firms not targeted by shareholder activists.
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Following Vafeas (2003), Clifford (2008) and Certo, Dalton, Dalton and Lester (2008),
all financial and utility firms are dropped, as these industries are highly regulated, which
could impact governance variables. Thus, all firms in SICs between 4900 and 4999
(utilities) and 6000-6999 (financial institutions) are dropped from the sample. The
original sample consists of the top 100 US and UK publicly held firms as measured by
market capitalization in March, 2009 and was drawn from Thomson One Financial. For
13 firms, data was not available leaving a final sample of 94 US firms and 93 UK firms.
The final panel dataset consists of a total of 187 firms with observations over eight years
(2000-2007), creating a total of 1,444 firm year observations.
However, due to some missing observations on some variables, some analyses
will show slightly different total firm year observations. All financial information was
sourced from Thomson One Financial. Information on US company board of directors
was sourced from Risk Metrics while UK company board information was sourced from
annual reports. Compact Disclosure was the source of ownership data on US firms and
annual reports were used to gather ownership data on UK firms.
Country Selection
The two country environments of the US and the UK are selected for several
reasons. First, the US is selected because it is the largest economy in the world,
representing roughly 25% of world GDP (CIA World Fact Book). Shareholder activism
originated in the US and, thus, there is a higher incidence of shareholder activism than in
other countries. Second, the UK is selected because the governance environment in the
UK is viewed by many to be more advanced than in the US, and shareholder activism is
also a prevalent governance mechanism (Becht et al. (2009).
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Becht et al. (2009) provide an excellent overview of the differences between the
governance environments of the US and the UK. The legal environment in the UK
provides shareholders with more rights than in the US. For example, in the UK,
shareholders have the right to call extraordinary general meetings with only 10% of the
shareholders requesting the meeting. In the UK, it is much easier and less expensive to
get a proxy resolution added to the ballot. As few as 5% of the shareholders or a
minimum of 100 shareholders can get a resolution put on the ballot at the annual
shareholders meeting. In the US, those submitting proxy resolutions must pay the full
cost, which can be prohibitive for most investors.
In addition, there are differences in how boards of directors are appointed and
removed. Board members in the US are appointed via elections but do not require a
majority vote, whereas in the UK a majority vote is necessary. In the US, it is much
more difficult to remove a board director member, as the decision must be unanimous.
Conversely, in the UK, a director can be removed via a proxy resolution vote. In
the US, board director terms are staggered, which means that only a portion of the board
comes up for reelection at one specific time. US firms also have the ability to create
poison pills to fend off hostile takeovers while that is not allowed in the UK. Finally,
CEO duality is much more common in the USA than in the UK (Aguilera et al., 2006).
In conclusion, both governance environments enable shareholder activism, but the
governance environments in the UK rely on other governance mechanisms than does the
USA.
Tables 3 and 4 show the full listing of companies used in the study and includes
information about how many years these firms were targeted by FDSA and the total
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TABLE 3 - US FIRMS TARGETED BY FDSA
Firm
3M Company
Abbott Laboratories

# years
targeted
by FDSA
0
1

total # of
FDSA
attempts Firm
Honeywell International Inc
0
1
Illinois Tool Works Inc
Intel Corp.
0

# years
targeted
by FDSA

total# of
FDSA
attempts

0
0
0
4

0
0

0
0

International Business Machines Corp.
Johnson & Johnson

2

0
12
2

0
1

0
1

Kimberly-Clark Corp.
Lockheed Martin Corp.

0
0

0
0

Apache Corp.
Apple Inc
Applied Materials Inc

0
2
1

0

Lowe's Companies Inc

2
1

Marathon Oil Corp.
McDonalds Corp.

0
1

0
1

Archer-Daniels-Midland Company
AT & T Inc

0
0

Medtronic Inc
Merck & Company Inc

Baker Hughes Inc
Baxter International Inc
Best Buy Company Inc

0

0
0
0

0
0

0
0

Monsanto Company

0
0

Bristol Myers Squibb Company
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp
Caterpillar Inc

0

0

Motorola Inc
National Oilwell Varco Inc

2
0

0
1

0
4

0

Chevron Corp.

2
2

3
2

Nike Inc
Northrop Grumman Corp.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.

0
0
0

0
0
0

0

0

0
1

0

Alcoa Incorporated
Altria Group Inc
Amazon.com Inc
Amgen Inc
Anadarko Petroleum Corp.

Cisco Systems Inc
Colgate-Palmolive Company
Comcast Corp.
Conocophillips
Corning Inc
Costco Wholesale Corp.
CVS Caremark Corp.
Danaher Corp.
Deere & Company
Dell Inc
Devon Energy Corp.
Dow Chemical Company
Ebay Inc
EI Du Pont De Nemours
ELI Lilly & Company

0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

5
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

EMC Corp.

1

1

Emerson Electric Company

1

2

Exxon Mobil Corp.

0
0

0
0
1

Genentech Inc

1
0

General Dynamics Corp.
General Electric Company

0
2

Gilead Sciences Inc
Halliburton Company

0

0
2
0

Hess Corp.

0
0

0
0

Hewlett-Packard Company
Home Depot Inc

2
2

9
13

Fedex Corp.
Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold

0

Microsoft Corp.

Pepsico Inc
Pfizer Inc
Praxair Inc
Qualcomm Inc

2
0
0

0
0
0
3
0
0

Raytheon Company
Schering-Plough Corp.

0
0

Schlumberger Limited

0

Sprint Nextel Corp.

2
0

Stryker Corp.
Target Corp.
Texas Instruments Inc

0
0

6
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0

The Boeing Company
The Coca Cola Company
The Procter & Gamble Company

0
4
1

0
0
4
1

The Walt Disney Company
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inco

2

9

0

Time Warner Inc
Transocean Limited

3
0

0
8

Union Pacific Corp.
United Parcel Service Inc
United Technologies Corp.

1

1

0
0

0
0

Valero Energy Corp.
Verizon Communications

0
4

0
5

Viacom Inc
Wal Mart Stores Inc

0
1

0
1

Walgreen Company

0

Wyeth
XTO Energy Inc

1
0

0
1
0

0
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TABLE 4 - UK FIRMS TARGETED BY FDSA
Firm
Amec PLC
Antofagasta PLC
Associated British Foods PLC
Astrazeneca PLC
Autonomy Corp. PLC
BAE Systems PLC
Balfour Beatty PLC
Barratt Developments PLC
Berkeley Group Holdings PLC
BG Group PLC
BHP Billiton PLC
BPPLC
British Airways PLC
British American Tobacco PLC
British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC
BT Group PLC
Bunzl PLC
Burberry Group PLC
Cable & Wireless PLC
Cadbury PLC
Cairn Energy PLC
Carnival PLC
Carphone Warehouse Group PLC
Cobham PLC
Compass Group PLC
Daily Mail & General Trust PLC
Diageo PLC
DSG International PLC
Easyjet PLC
Enterprise Inns PLC
Experian PLC
First Group PLC
G4S PLC
GKNPLC
Glaxosmithkline PLC
Hays PLC
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC
Inchcape PLC
Informa PLC
Intercontinental Hotels Group PLC
Invensys PLC
ITVPLC
Johnson Matthey PLC
Kesa Electricals PLC
Kingfisher PLC
Ladbrokes PLC

# years
targeted
by FDSA
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

total # of
FDSA
attempts
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

Firm
Logica PLC
Lonmin PLC
Marks & Spencer Group PLC
Meggitt PLC
Mitchells & Butlers PLC
Morrison (WM) Supermarkets PLC
National Express Group PLC
Next PLC
Pearson PLC
Persimmon PLC
Petrofac Limited
Premier Foods PLC
Punch Taverns PLC
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC
Reed Elsevier PLC
Rentokil Initial PLC
Rexam PLC
Rio Tinto PLC
Rolls-Royce Group PLC
Royal Dutch Shell PLC
Sabmiller PLC
Sainsbury (J) PLC
Serco Group PLC
Shire PLC
Sibir Energy PLC
Smith & Nephew PLC
Smiths Group PLC
Stagecoach Group PLC
Tate & Lyle PLC
Taylor Wimpey PLC
Tesco PLC
The Capita Group PLC
The Sage Group PLC
Tullow Oil PLC
Unilever PLC
Vedanta Resources PLC
Vodafone Group PLC
Weir Group PLC
Whitbread PLC
William Hill PLC
Wolseley PLC
Wood Group (John) PLC
WPP PLC
Xstrata PLC
Yell Group PLC

# years
targeted
by FDSA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

total # of
FDSA
attempts
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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number of FDSA attempts. For example, Home Depot, Inc., a US-based home
improvement retailer, was targeted two years of the sample time frame, but was targeted
by thirteen separate groups of activists and/or activism objectives. A closer look at the
data reveals that six of the activism efforts occurred in 2006 and seven in 2007.
Measures
Table 5 contains a listing of all variables used in the study, operational
definitions, years of data collected, source of the data and an indication of whether the
variable used is collected one year prior to the activism event (t-1), the year of the
activism event (t=0), the year after the activism event (t+1) or two years after the
activism event (t+2).
The research model includes two broad sets of analyses. In the first set of
analyses, a broad set of variables are used to predict the incidence of FDSA. In the
second set of analyses, another set of variables are used to determine the impact of FDSA
on changes in firm performance. First, measures for independent variables are introduced
followed by the control variables and the dependent variables. All of the independent
variables to test the first set of hypotheses related to antecedents are measured in the year
prior to the activism event and independent variables used to test effects are measured the
year of the activism event. All measures of firm performance subsequent to the FDSA
event are measured for both one and two years after the activism event.
Independent Variables:
Proxies for Agency Theory predictors of FDSA. Three variables are used as proxies of
principal-agency predictors of FDSA: board independence, outside director busyness,
and CEO duality. Board independence refers to the make-up of outsiders

1999-2006

Total ownership percentage of blockholder owners

Dummy variable coded 0/1 - coded 1 if top owner is pressure
insensitive. (0= mutual funds, insurance companies, trusts,
CEO owners, 1 = hedge funds, unaffiliated corporations,
private equity firms, pension fund)

Blockholder Ownership

Pressure

1999-2006

1999-2006

1999-2006

Years
collected
1999-2006

1999-2006

Definition
Ratio of outside board members to the total number of board
members.

Outside Director Busyness Number of director positions held by outside directors of the
firm/number of outside directors
CEO Duality
Dummy Variable coded 0/1 - coding 0 for separated CEO and
Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role
Debt Level
Total debt/total assets

Variable
Board Independence

TABLE 5 - DISCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

UK-Annual Reports
US-Compact
Disclosure
UK-Annual Reports
US-Compact
Disclosure

UK-Annual Reports,
US-Risk Metrics
UK-Annual Reports,
US-Risk Metrics
Thomson

Source
UK-Annual Reports,
US-Risk Metrics

t-1

t-1

t-1

t-1

t-1

Matching
year of
Activism
t-1

o

00

Dummy variable coded 0/1- coded 0=US, l=UK

Year of the activism event - number of years since
incorporation
Log of book value of total assets

Total number of executive and non-executive directors that
make up the board
Total debt divided by total assets

Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and
Amortization (EBIDTA) divided by total assets
TOTAL INVESTMENT RETURN = (Market Price Year End +
Dividends Per Share + Special Dividend -Quarter 1 + Special
Dividend-Quarter 2 + Special Dividend-Quarter 3 + Special
Dividend-Quarter 4) / Last Year's Market Price-Year End -1)
*100
(Operating income before depreciation minus total income
taxes + deferred taxes from the previous year to the current
year - gross interest expense on debt - dividends paid)/book
value of total assets
Seven indicator variables are used representing eight
industries based on one-digit SIC classification
Eight variables with the year 2000 being the base category

Country

Firm Age

Board Size

ROA

Year of activism event

industry

Free Cash Flow

Return

Debt

Firm Size

Definition

Variable
Control Variables

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

2000-2007

2000

1999-2007

1999-2007

1999-2007

1999-2007

1999-2006

1999-2007

1999-2007

Years
collected

t

t

Thomson
Factiva

t-1, t=0

Thomson

t-l,t=0

t-1, t=0

Thomson
Thomson

t-l,t=0

t-1

t-l,t=0

Thomson
UK-Annual Reports,
US-Risk Metrics
Thomson

t-l,t=0

Thomson

Source

Matching
year of
Activism

Thomson
2001-2008

2 year change in ROA

(ROAyear2- ROAyear0)/ROAyear0

Thomson

2001-2008

t+2

t+1

t+2

Thomson

2001-2008

2 year change in Tobin's Q (TOBIN in year 2 - TOBIN in year 0)/TOBIN in year 0 where
Tobin's Q = Book value of assets - book value of"common
equity + market value of common equity/ Book value of
assets)
1 year change in ROA
(ROA in yearl- ROA in year 0)/ROA in year 0

t

t

t

t+1

Factiva

Factiva

Source

Matching
year of
Activism

Thomson

2001-2008

2000-2007

2000-2007

2000-2007

Years
collected

1 year change in Tobin's Q (TOBIN in year 1 - TOBIN in year 0)/TOBIN in year 0 where
Tobin's Q = Book value of assets - book value of common
equity + market value of common equity/ Book value of
assets)

Dependent Variables for Effects

FDSAxCountry

interaction of FDSA x Country

Total count of FDSA events in one year

FDSA Count

Moderators

Dummy variable coded 0/1 - coded 1 if there is FDSA

FDSA

Definition
Variable
Dependent Variables for Antecedents

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

to

00
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versus insiders that comprise the board of directors of a firm. Following Ferris et al.
(2003), an outside board member is classified as a board member who is not currently
working at the firm. Thus, board independence is calculated by the ratio of outside
board members to the total number of board members and is collected each prior year
from 1999-2006. Data on US firms was sourced from the Risk Metrics database while
data on UK firms were gathered from annual reports.
Outside director busyness refers to the number of outside board seats each
director holds divided by the number of outside directors. In general, board of director
busyness has been measured several different ways. First, Jiraporn et al. (2009) measures
the total number of outside directorships held by both inside and outside directors.
Second, Ferris et al. (2003) used four different measures for board busyness. One was
the average number of directors' positions held by all the directors. Two, they measured
the maximum number of director positions held. Three, they measured the percentage of
directors that held three or more outside director positions. Four, they focus only on
outside directors and measured the average number of outside director positions held by
outside board members.
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) criticize the operationalization of the Ferris et al.
(2003) study, suggesting that their measures are noisy. Instead, they define a board as
busy if a majority of the outside directors have three or more board positions.
Finally, Jackling and Johl (2009) use two measures of board busyness. The first
measure of board busyness is the average number of directorships held by both inside and
outside directors of a firm. The second measure is the average number of director
positions held by outside directors of the firm.
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As this study is indirectly examining the monitoring capabilities of outside board
members, the second Jackling and Johl (2009) measure is used. Thus, outside director
busyness is measured as the average number of director positions held by outside
directors of the firm. The outside director busyness variable is collected for the prior year
from 1999 to 2006 and is sourced from Risk Metrics for US firms and from annual
reports for UK firms.
CEO duality is the third agency theory-related predictor of FDSA. The board of
directors plays an important role as the watchdog for the shareholders (Fama & Jensen,
1983). The chairperson heads the group of board of directors. There may be a conflict of
interest when the Chairperson is also the CEO (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Fizel & Louie,
1990; Daynton, 1984). Furthermore, Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that a CEO who
is also the Chairperson of the board may be more likely to select board members who will
not challenge him/her. Following Boyd (1995), a dummy variable for CEO duality is
created by coding 0 for separated CEO and Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair
role. CEO duality data is collected annually from 1999-2006, lagged one year, and is
sourced from Risk Metrics for US companies and annual reports for UK companies.
Proxies for Principal-Principal Problems
In this study, three variables are used to examine the impact of principal-principal
problems on financially driven shareholder activism. The first variable is debt level,
which is calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996)
used this measure in their study of CEO duality. Debt level is collected annually from
Thompson One from 1999-2006 and is also lagged one year.
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The second variable is blockholder ownership, which is defined as the
percentage of ownership held by the stated blockholders. In the US, a blockholder owns
a 5% or more equity stake in the company while in the UK, a blockholder owns 3% or
more equity. Blockholder ownership data is collected annually from 1999 to 2006
from Compact Disclosure for US companies and from annual reports for UK companies
and is also lagged one year.
The third variable, Pressure, is abbreviated for Pressure resistance by the top
owner and is a 0/1 dummy variable created using the Brickley et al. (1988) typology.
First, each top shareholder of each firm in the sample is identified. Then an internet
search using Google is conducted to determine the type of owner and then finally
categorized into two groups: pressure sensitive or pressure resistant. Pressure takes on
the value of 0 when the top shareholder is pressure sensitive and is classified as either a
mutual fund, insurance company, trust, or an insider owner and takes on a value of 1
when the top owner is pressure resistant and is classified as a hedge fund, unaffiliated
Corporation, private equity firm, or a pension fund. Pressure data is collected annually
from 1999-2006 and is sourced from Compact Disclosure for US companies and from
annual reports for UK companies.
Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables are used in this study: financially driven shareholder
activism (FDSA) and changes in firm performance.
Financially driven shareholder activism (FDSA). The variable FDSA is coded
as both a dichotomous variable and a continuous variable. First, FDSA is collected using
content analysis. A search for the keyword term "shareholder activism" for each
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company was conducted for the years 2000 through 2007 using the Dow Jones Factiva
Database. Two independent coders, the author and a Masters degree student, noted the
date of the activism event, method of activism, goal of the activism, initiator of the
activism, and the outcome of the activism. Inter-coder reliability was checked by having
both coders evaluate the same 60 companies. After that process, results were compared
and an inter-coder reliability of 92% was found. The two coders met to discuss
discrepancies and arrive at a consensus to jointly recode data. After concluding that this
coding scheme was reliable, the author coded 60 firms, and the coding assistant coded
187 firms.
In addition, the activism event was later coded into two categories: financially
driven and non-financially driven activism. FDSA was coded two ways. First, FDSA is
a dichotomous variable taking on a value of 0 if there is no FDSA and 1 if there is an
incidence of FDSA. In addition, a continuous measure of FDSA was developed. FDSA
count is defined as the total number of separate activism events designated by either
distinct activism objectives or distinct activist parties.
Long-term Firm Performance. For the second stage of the analysis measuring
the effects of FDSA, measures for firm performance are required. Examining the
literature, there is a multitude of ways to measure firm performance. First, many studies
calculate short and longer term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon the
announcement of the stock purchase by a blpckholder, the release of a focus list or a
proxy resolution announcement (See Faulkner et al.,1990; Carleton et al., 1998; Gillan &
Starks, 2000; Caton et al., 2001; Song & Szewczyk, 2003; English et al., 2004; Mulherin
& Poulsen, 1998; Thomas et al., 2005; Nelson, 2005; Barber, 2006; Boyson &
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Mooradian, 2007; Bratton, 2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Croci, 2007; Becht et al.,
2009). Second, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) calculate Buy and Hold Returns
(BAHRs) as the average three year total compounded returns of the targeted firm less
three year compounded return of the control group.
Third, numerous researchers calculate the year-over-year changes in accounting
and market performance measures. As FDSAs are looking for positive changes in firm
performance, this study follows Karpoff et al. (1996), Smith (1996), Bethel et al. (1998),
Klein and Zur (2006), Boyson and Mooradian (2007) in the use of year over year changes
in firm performance.
Data is collected for one and two year changes in both financial and market based
performance measures. Change in ROA is used as the accounting-based performance
measure and change in Tobin's Q is used as the market-based performance measure.
Following Smith (1996), all change performance measures are lagged one and two years
after to being targeted by FDSA (which provides a longer term perspective than previous
studies). Change in ROA is defined as ROA (t +1) minus ROA (t) divided by ROA (t >.
Change in Tobin's Q is defined as Q (t+i) minus Q (t) divided by Q (t> Following
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Maury and Pajuste (2005), Tobin's Q is calculated as
the ratio of the market value of assets over its book value of assets, where the market
value of assets is computed as the book value of assets minus the book value of common
equity plus the market value of common equity. Data is sourced from Thomson One and
collected for each year from 2001-2008.
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Control Variables
Control variables are used in both antecedent and effects models. Nine control
variables are used in the first set of models examining the antecedents of FDSA and most
captured in the year prior (t-1): country, firm age, firm size, board size, prior firm
performance, free cash flow, year of activism event and industry. As this is a two
country study, a control variable is used to capture any effects of difference governance
environments. Country is coded 0 if the target firm is US-based and 1 if the firm is UKbased. Mishra, Rand0y, and Jenssen (2001) determined that firm age is an important
determinant for business characteristics and company goals. Firm age is calculated by
the total number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the difference between
the year prior to the activism event and the firm's year of incorporation. Firm age data
is sourced from Thomson One. Another control variable is firm size, which is measured
by the log of book value of total assets.
As Buchanan and Yang (2009) show a positive relationship between board size
and activism in their sample of UK and US shareholder proposals, board size is included
in the study as a control variable. Board size is defined as the total number of members
that are on the board of directors. Data on board size is sourced from RiskMetrics for
US companies and annual reports for UK companies. Board size is also captured in the
year prior to the activism event.
As prior performance has been shown to be an antecedent of shareholder
activism, it is included in the study as a control variable and is measured by return on
assets (ROA) and prior return. ROA is measured by Earnings before Interest, Taxes,
Depreciation and Amortization (EBIDTA) divided by total assets. As Cochran and
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Wood (1984) suggest, accounting measures of performance are easily manipulated by
managers, so a market measure of performance is also included. Return is total
investment return and is defined as the year end market price plus dividends per share
plus special dividends in each quarter divided by last year's end year market price minus
one all multiplied by 100. All prior performance data is from 1999-2006 and is accessed
from Thomson One.
As free cash flow is often a proxy for agency problems, it is included as a control
variable. Free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus total
income taxes plus deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year minus gross
interest expense on debt minus dividends paid divided by book value of total assets. Free
cash flow data is accessed from Thomson One.
To control for the industry effects, eight indicator variables are used representing
nine industries based on one-digit SIC classification. A control variable is created for
year of the activism event by using eight variables with the year 2000 being the base
category.
Control variables for the second set of models testing the effects of FDSA on firm
performance include country, firm age, firm size, debt level, free cash flow, year of
FDSA and industry. All variables have similar operationalizations as above but are
measured as t=0 variables and are matched to same year of the FDSA event.
Moderators
One moderator is used with the second set of analyses examining the impact of
FDSA on changes in firm performance: FDSA x Country. FDSA x Country is an
interaction term created by the multiplying FDSA by Country which will test the impact
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of governance environment on the relationship between FDSA and changes in firm
performance.
Data Analysis
As the data contains non-independent observations with cross-sectional, time
series data, panel data analysis is employed using STATA 10.0, a statistical program. As
the type of statistical analysis used depends on the nature of the dependent variable,
several different types of panel data analyses are conducted. First, to test the antecedents
of FDSA, a dichotomous variable, logistic regression for panel data is used (i.e., the
XTLOGIT procedure in STATA). Second, to test the antecedents of FDSA Count, a
continuous variable, poisson regression for panel data is used (ie. the XTPOISSON
procedure in STATA). Third, to test the effects of FDSA on changes in firm
performance, a continuous variable, regression for panel data is used (ie. the XTREG
procedure in STATA).
Summary
In this chapter, the research design, sample, variables and their operationalizations
were introduced and procedures for data analysis were described. In the next chapter, the
results of the analysis will be presented.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

In this chapter, results of the statistical analyses are presented. First, descriptive statistics
of the sample are introduced, followed by correlation and linearity analyses and the panel
data regression analyses. Models are also adjusted to address any multi-co-linearity
issues. Finally, a summary of hypotheses test results is presented.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the full sample are presented in Table 6. Although the
original sample was 100 US firms and 100 UK firms, data could be found on a total of
187 firms, 94 in the US and 93 in the UK. These data on these 187 firms was collected
for 8 years from 2000 to 2007, resulting in a total possible 1,488 observations. However,
missing data reduced the sample to a maximum of 1,444 firm year observations. In
addition, the t+2 year variables of 2 year change in ROA and 2 year change in Tobin's
Q were limited by data availability reducing the section of analysis using t+2 variables to
1,229 firm-year observations.
For the full sample, the mean of FDSA is .05 indicating that most firms are not
targeted by FDSA. Examining FDSA Count, it is apparent that some companies are
targeted multiple times in one year by FDSAs. In Figure 2, FDSA and FDSA Count are
shown by year. There was very little shareholder activism in the early years of the
sample and both FDSA and FDSA Count have grown substantially since 2001.
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FIGURE 2- INCIDENCE OF FDSA AND FDSA COUNT BY YEAR
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In the full sample, firms in the sample experienced declines in mean market-based
measures of financial performance and increases in accounting-based performance. The
means for one and two year changes in Tobin's Q were -.04 and -.03 respectively,
while the mean for one and two year changes in ROA were .48 and .49. In Tables 7
and 8, descriptive statistics are presented for US and UK firms separately and some
interesting differences are noted via t-test results in Table 9.
First, there is significantly more FDSA in the US sample than in the UK sample
with FDSA occurring in 8% of the firm year observations compared to just 3% in the UK
(t = 4.14, p<.001). The intensity of FDSA is also much higher in the US with mean a
FDSA count of 15% versus the UK's 4% and is also statistically significant (t = 3.96,
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TABLE 9 - T-TESTS COMPARING MEANS OF KEY VARIABLES

Variable
FDSA
FDSA Count
Board Independence
Outside Director busyness
CEO duality
Debt level
BH Ownership
Pressure
Free Cash Flow
Return
Board size
Firm age
total assets
ROA
1 yr change in Tobin's Q
2 yr change in Tobin's Q
1 year change in ROA
2 year change in ROA

Mean
0.08
0.15
0.84
1.42
0.84
21.65
0.26
0.05
0.05
19.16
11.30
54.03
40,987
8.35
-0.04
-0.03
0.48
0.59

Mean
0.03
0.04
0.57
2.21
0.05
26.40
0.32
0.13
0.01
19.88
10.69
48.91
16,532
7.47
-0.01
0.03
0.22
1.08

T-Stat
413 ***
3.96 **
43.87 ***
18.06 ***
47.35 ***
5.32 ***
0.56
5.00 ***
4.78 ***
0.14
4.30 ***
2.28 *
7.58 ***
1.97*
1.66 f
2.70 **
0.44
0.51
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p<.001). Examining mean changes in financial performance, changes in one and two
year Tobin's Q are lower for US companies compared to the UK with approaching
significance for changes in one year Tobin Q (t = 1.66, p<.10) and significant for changes
in two year Tobin's Q (t = 2.70, p<.05). While mean changes in one and two year ROA
are mixed, neither is statistically significant. In the US, the mean one year change in
ROA is .48 compared to .22 for the UK and the mean two year change in ROI is .59 in
the US compared to 1.08 in the UK.
Examining the independent variables in the study, there are some noteworthy
differences between the US and the UK sample. In the US, CEO duality is high with a
mean of 85% of firms having the same person hold both CEO and chairperson of the
board roles and this is highly significant (t = 47.35, p<.001). In contrast, just 5% of UK
firms have CEO duality. In the US, boards are significantly more independent than in the
UK with a mean ratio of outsiders to total directors of .84 versus .57 in the UK (t= 43.87,
p<.001). UK boards are significantly busier boards with a mean of 2.21 outside
directorships per outside board member compared to 1.42 in the US (t= 18.06, p<.001).
UK boards are also smaller than US boards with a mean of 10.69 compared with 11.30
for US firms (t= 4.30, p<.001). UK firms are more likely to have a pressure resistant top
owner with a mean of .13 versus .25 for US firms and that finding is also significant (t=
5.00, p<.001). While UK firms have a higher mean level of blockholder ownership than
in the US with a mean of .32 versus .26 in the US, that finding is not statistically
significant.
Examining operating and profitability ratios, there are also significant differences
between firms in the two countries. US firms operate with higher levels of free cash flow
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with a mean of .05 compared to .01 in the UK (t= 4.78, p<.001). UK firms are more
leveraged than US firms with a mean debt to asset ratio of 26.4 percent versus 21.65
percent for US firms and that finding is highly significant (t= 5.32, p<.001). Comparing
ROA, US firms have higher ROA with a mean of 8.35 percent versus 7.47 percent (t=
1.97, p<.05) for UK firms. No significant differences in total investment return are
found.
Finally, looking at firm age and firm size, US firms are bigger and older than UK
firms. Mean value of total assets for US firms is 40,987 versus 16,532 for UK firms (t=
7.58, p<.001). US firms have been incorporated for a mean time frame of 54 years, while
UK firms' mean is 49 years (t= 2.28, p<.05).
These descriptive statistics support Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp's
(2006) contention that despite the similarities in governance structures, US and UK firms
have substantial differences that signify a need for more studies contrasting US and UK
firms.
In addition, all variables were tested for normality using the STATA 10.0
Skewness-Kurtosis test (sktest) and all variables are found to be normally distributed
except for variable, firm size. Once the variable firm size is transformed by calculating
the log of total assets, it is within normal limits.
Correlation Analysis
Next, correlations for all the variables included in the study are presented in Table
10. Dummy variables for year and industry have not been included. There seem to be no
major problems with multi-co-linearity as all correlations are under .9. There are a few
variables, such as FDSA and FDSA Count, and 1 and 2 year change in ROA and 1 and 2
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year change in Tobin's Q which are co-linear, but will not be used in the same analysis.
Checking for multi-co-linearity, all independent and control variables have variance
inflation factors (VIF) well under the suggested value of 10 with the highest value equal
to 5.6. To ensure the results are robust, all models are rerun with the goal of keeping all
VIF values under 4.0 and the results remain quantitatively similar (O'Brien, 2007). VIF
values will be discussed as each set of analyses is presented.
Panel Data Analysis
Random effects panel data analysis was used throughout this study for several
reasons. First, fixed effects logistic regression models use an unseen dummy variable for
each panel data point that captures that firm's specific effect in the model. In firms that
have had no incidence of FDSA, the dummy variable is co-linear with the dependent
variable precluding a fixed-effects model from being generated. Second, fixed-effects
models were run and Hausman tests support using random effects models.
Six sets of analyses were run. In the first set of analyses, hypotheses relating to
antecedents of FDSA were tested using a dichotomous dependent variable, FDSA.
Second, antecedents of FDSA were tested using a continuous dependent variable, FDSA
count. The third and fourth analyses tested the effects of FDSA on one and two year
changes in market-based performance, and the fifth and sixth set of analyses tested the
effects of the FDSA on one and two year changes in accounting-based performance.
Additional analyses split the sample by country to examine the effects of FDSA on
changes in market-based performance.
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n = 1,444

19 Country

18 2 year change in ROA

17 1 year change in ROA

16 2 yr change in Tobins

15 1 yr change in Tobins

13 log Firm Size
14ROA

12 Firm age

11 Board size

9 Free Cash Flow
10 Return

8 Debt level

7 BH Ownership

6 Pressure

5 Outside Director busyness

3 CEO duality
4 Board Independence

2 FDSA Count

1 FDSA

1
2
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Antecedents of FDSA and FDSA Count
The results of the panel data logistic regressions with FDSA as the dependent
variable can be found in Table 11. Three models are built and tested in a hierarchical
manner. In Model 1, only control variables including the dummy variables for year and
industry are used. In Model 2, the six main effect variables are added. In Model 3, the
model is adjusted to minimize multi-co-linearity with all variables having VIF values of
less than 2.4 and an overall model mean VIF score of 1.32. Thus, comparing Model 2
and Model 3, it can be demonstrated that the model remains robust. Furthermore, there
are significant improvements to both Models 2 and 3 as indicated by changes in the ChiSquare values and using a Chi-Square test of model fit. In addition, likelihood ratio tests
indicate a significant improvement in model fit of Models 2 and 3.
HI suggested that there would be a negative relationship between board
independence and FDSA. In Model 2, the coefficient for board independence is not
significant; therefore, HI is not supported. H2 posited a positive relationship between
CEO duality and FDSA. Once again, our data show no support for H2. H3 stated that
there would be a positive relationship between outside director busyness and FDSA.
Again, the results show no support for H3.
H4 predicted a negative relationship between debt levels and FDSA. No support
was found for H4. H5 suggested that there would be a negative relationship between
total blockholder ownership and FDSA. The coefficient of blockholder ownership is
negative and significant, thus providing relatively strong support for H5 (Model 2: /? = 4.162,/? < .01). H6 predicted a positive relationship between pressure resistant
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TABLE 11
PANEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF THE ANTECEDENTS OF FDSA
Dependent Variable = FDSA
Variable
Controls:
Country
Firm Age
log Firm Size
Board Size
ROA
Return
Free Cash Flow
Year
Industry
Constant
Main effects:
Board independence
Outside Director Busyness
CEO duality
Debt Level
BH Ownership
Pressure
n= 1,288
-2 log likelihood
Model x2

Ax2

MODEL 1
Coef.
S.E.
-0.431
0.005
0.916 ***
-0.033
0.034 t
-0.013 **
-0.544
Included
Included
-13.88 ***

0.460
0.005
0.206
0.076
0.021
0.006
0.810

2.12

MODEL 2
Coef.

0.221
0.820
0.005
0.005
0.815 *** 0.210
-0.048
0.079
0.007
0.024
-0.012 *
0.006
-0.838
0.809
Included[
Included[
-14.338 *** 2.680
3.174 t
0.210
-0.222
-0.014
-4.162 **
1.127 *

-217.6
55.42 ***

S.E.

-202.4
66.23**;
10.81 t

f p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed)

2.129
0.256
0.503
0.013
1.560
0.655

MODEL 3
Coef.

S.E.

0.005
0.005
0 793 *** 0.179
0.007
-0.012 *
-0.908
Included
Included
-13.561 ***

0.024
0.006
0.829

3.034 *
0.216
-0.261
-0.016
-3.828 **
1.061 f

1.748
0.220
0.461
0.013
1.496
0.652

-203.2
61.94***
6.52*

2.263
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ownership and FDSA. The coefficient of pressure is positive and significant. Thus, H6
is supported by our data (Model 2: (5 = 1.127,/? < .05).
The next set of regressions is run using FDSA Count as the dependent variable
using a panel data Poisson regression. Table 12 reports the results. Model 1 contains just
the control variables. Model 2 contains the control variables plus the six main effects.
Model 2 variables have VIF values as high as 5.6. In Model 3, the model is adjusted to
minimize multi-co-linearity with all variables having VIF values of less than 2.4 and an
over model mean VIF score of 1.32. Thus, comparing Model 2 and Model 3, it can be
demonstrated that the model remains robust. Unfortunately, there was no significant
improvement of the fit in Models 2 and 3 as indicated by the 1.03 change in model ChiSquare. Furthermore, the log ratio tests do not indicate a significant improvement in
model fit. In this model, support is found for H5 (Model 2: /? = -3.328,/? < .01), which
states that there should be a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and
FDSA. No support for the other five hypotheses using FDSA Count as the dependent
variable.
Effects of FDSA
The second part of the research model tests the remaining two hypotheses that
utilize competing hypotheses to posit the effects of FDSA on changes in firm
performance. Tables 13 reports the analyses in which the dependent variables are 1 year
change in Tobin's Q and 2 year change in Tobin's Q. Six models are tested. For each
dependent variable, models are built in a hierarchical fashion with control variables only
in Models 1 and 4. Models 2 and 5 test the control variables plus main effects. Model 3
and 6 test control variables, main effects, and interactions. In all three models, there are
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TABLE 12
PANEL DATA POISSON REGRESSION ANTECEDENTS OF FDSA COUNT

Dependent Variable = FDSA Count
MODEL 1
Coef.
S.E.
Variable
Controls:
0.426
Country
-0.635 t
0.004
Firm Age
0.007 t
0.912 *** 0.198
log Firm Size
-0.034
0.057
Board Size
0.028
**
0.015
ROA
Return
-0.009 ** 0.004
-0.758
0.652
Free Cash Flow
Year
Included
Industry
Included
-13.719 *** 2.107
Constant
Main effects:
Board independence
Outside BOD Busyness
CEO duality
Debt Level
BH Ownership
Pressure
n= 1,288
-2 log likelihood

Model x2
AX2

-340.5
76.24**:

MODEL 2
Coef.
-0.297
0.005
0.910 ***
-0.053
0.012
-0.009 **
-0.661
Included
Included
-14.137 ***
0.882
0.242
0.083
0.007
-3.328 **
0.786

-324.2
79.15
2.91

t p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one tailed)

S.E.
0.679
0.005
0.221
0.060
0.020
0.004
0.664

2.598
1.767
0.224
0.340
0.012
1.344
0.691

MODEL 3
Coef.

S.E.

0.004
0.006 t
0 97i *** 0.203
0.012
-0.009 *
-0.759
Included
Included
-14.372 ***
1.654
0.216
0.108
0.004
-2.921 *
0.711

-327.3
77.27
1.03

0.019
0.004
0.670

2.305
1.431
0.220
0.323
0.012
1.262
0.663

1,415
0.23
431.7***

0.019
0.000
-0.008 t
0.022
0.000
Included
Included
-0.030
0.064

0.016
0.000
0.006
0.048
0.000

2.7

1415
0.23
435.9***
1.5

0.071

-0.083
1,415
0.23
434.4***

0.036

0.067 **

0.031

0.047 f

0.065

0.065

0.017
0.000
0.006
0.048
0.000

0.023
0.000
-0.009 |
0.021
0.000
Included
Included
-0.020

0.016
0.000
0.006
0.048
0.000

0.019
0.000
-0.010 f
0.023
0.000
Included
Included
-0.014

t p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one tailed)

AX2

Model x2

N
R2

DV:
Variable
Controls:
Country
Firm Age
log Firm Size
Free Cash Flow
Debt level
Year
Industry
Constant
Main effects:
FDSA
Interactions:
FDSAxCountry

MODEL 1
MODEL 2
MODEL 3
1 yr A in Tobin'isQ
1 yr A in Tobin'sQ
1 yr A in Tobin'sQ
Coef.
S.E.
S.E.
S.E.
Coef.
Coef.

1229.0
0.21
360.8***

0.042 |
0.000
-0.019 *
0.002
0.001 f
Included
Included
-0.061
0.111

0.030
0.000
0.011
0.068
0.001

MODEL 4
2yrA in Tobin'sQ
S.E.
Coef.

1229
0.22
367.6***
6.8 **

0.107 *

0.043 f
0.000
-0.022 *
0.004
0.001 t
Included
Included
-0.034

0.047

0.112

0.030
0.000
0.011
0.068
0.001

MODEL 5
2 yr A in Tobin'sQ
Coef.
S.E.

TABLE 13 - PANEL DATA REGRESSION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN FIRM PERFORMANCE

1229
0.22
368.1***
0.5

-0.075

0.125 **

0.047 *
0.000
-0.022 *
0.003
0.001 t
Included
Included
-0.040

0.110

0.054

0.112

0.031
0.000
0.011
0.068
0.001

MODEL 6
2yrA in Tobin'sQ
S.E.
Coef.
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no problems with multi-co-linearity as the mean VIF is 1.48 and all VIF values are under
2.0. All models are significant at the P<.001 level.

Chi-square difference tests only

show significant model improvement in Model 5, but not Models 2, 3, or 6.
H7a states that FDSA would have a positive effect on changes in firm
performance while H7b posits the opposite effect. Examining the first three models,
which test the effects on the one year change in market-based performance as measured
by Tobin's Q, we find that the coefficient of FDSA is positive and approaching
significance in Model 2 (Model 2: /? = .047, p < .10) and is highly significant in Model 3
(Model 3: /? = .067,p < .01). Thus, H7a is supported with 1 year change in Tobin's Q. In
Models 4 through 6, the dependent variable is 2 year change in Tobin's Q. Again, H7a is
strongly supported (Model 2: p = .107,p < .05 and Model 3: fi = A25,p < .01), while no
support is found for H7b.
H8a and H8b posit that governance environment will moderate the relationship
between FDSA and changes in firm performance. H8a predicts that the governance
environment will moderate the relationship between FDSA and changes in firm
performance and that the relationship would be positive and stronger in the US. H8b
states that the governance environment will moderate the relationship between FDSA and
changes in firm performance and that the relationship would be negative and stronger in
the US. An interaction term was created by multiplying FDSA by Country. While the
County and FDSA variables were both significant in Models 4-6, the interaction term was
not significant. Thus, another set of tests were run by separating the sample by country
and re-running the analysis with 1 year and 2 year changes in Tobin's Q as the dependent
variable. Table 14 shows the effects by country on 1 year changes in Tobin's Q and

Table 15 shows the effects on 2 year changes in Tobin's Q.
In Table 14, Models 1 and 2 show the impact of FDSA on 1 year changes in
Tobin's Q in US firms and Models 3 and 4 show similar results for UK firms. All four
models are significant. However, chi-square model difference tests show significant
improvement between Model 1 and 2, but not between Models 3 and 4. The coefficient
for FDSA in US firms is positive and significant (Model 2: fi = .068, p < .05) and while
there is no statistical support for any relationship between FDSA and changes in firm
performance in the UK firm sample. The result indicates that there is a difference
between countries in the FDSA-change in performance relationship and that the
relationship is positive and stronger in the US. Thus, there is H8a is supported and H8b
is not. Figure 3 shows the moderating effect of governance environment. As
hypothesized in H8a, the impact of FDSA on the 1 year change in Tobin's Q is positive
in the US and not in the UK. In the UK, the one year change in Tobin's Q as a result of
FDSA is actually slightly negative, but not statistically significant.

FIGURE 3 - 1 YEAR CHANGE IN TOBIN'S Q FOR US FIRMS
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TABLE 14 - PANEL DATA REGRESSION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN FIRM
PERFORMANCE BY COUNTRY

Country:
DV:
Variable
Controls:
Firm Age
log Firm Size
Free Cash Flow
Debt level
Year
Industry
Constant
Main effects:
FDSA
N
R2
Model %2
A* 2

MODEL 1
US

MODEL 2
US

1 yr A in Tobin's Q
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
-0.020 **
-0.353 **
0.002 **
Included
Included
0.087

0.000
0.009
0.151
0.001

0.097

MODEL 3
MODEL 4
UK
UK
1 yr A in Tobin'sQ 1 yr A in Tobin'sQ 1 yr A in Tobin'sQ
Coef.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
-0.023 ** 0.010
-0.368 ** 0.151
0.002 ** 0.001
Included
Included
0.122
0.098
0.068 *

739
30.45
316.59***

0.000
0.000
-0.006
0.008
0.038
0.053
-0.001
0.001
Included
Included
-0.017
0.079

-0.014

0.034

739
30.84
321 99***
5.4*

f p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed)

0.000
0.000
-0.005
0.009
0.038
0.053
-0.001
0.001
Included
Included
-0.020
0.080

676
22.51
191.43***

0.067

676
22.51
191.19***
-0.240
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Table 15 shows the results for 2 year changes in Tobin's Q. Models 1 and 2 tests
the relationship between FDSA and 2 year changes in Tobin's Q in US firms while
Models 3 and 4 test the same relationship in UK firms. All four models are significant at
the p<.001 level. Chi square model difference tests indicate significant improvement
between Models 1 and 2, but not Models 3 and 4. The coefficient for FDSA in US firms
is positive and significant (Model 2: ft = 1.43,/? < .01) and there is no statistical support
for any relationship between FDSA and changes in firm performance in the UK firm
sample. Again, there is support for H8a but not for H8b in the US.
Figure 4 shows the interaction effect graphically for US firms. As hypothesized
in H8a, the impact of FDSA on the 2 year change in Tobin's Q is positive in the US and
is stronger than the UK. In the UK, the two year change in Tobin's Q as a result of
FDSA is not statistically significant.
FIGURE 4- 2 YEAR CHANGE IN TOBIN'S Q FOR US FIRMS
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TABLE 15 - PANEL DATA REGRESSION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN FIRM
PERFORMANCE BY COUNTRY
DV: 2 yr A in Tobin'sQ
MODEL 2
MODEL 1
Country:
US
US
Coef.
S.E. Coef.
Variable
Controls:
Firm Age
log Firm Size
Free Cash Flow
Debt level
Year
Industry
Constant
Main effects:
FDSA
N
R2
Model x2

Ax2

0.000
-0.040 *
-0.902 ***
0.004 **
Included
Included
0.092

MODEL 3
UK
S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

MODEL 4
UK
Coef.

S.E.

0.001 0.000
0.001 0.000
0.000 0.000
0.000
0.013 -0.015
0.014
0.018 -0.044 ** 0.019 -0.014
0.233 -0.935 *** 0.232 0.004
0.075 0.005
0.075
0.001 0.004 ** 0.001 -0.002 * 0.001 -0.002 * 0.001
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
0.185 0.140
0.186 0.046
0.124 0.050
0.125
0.143 **

646
28.6
283.95***

0.050

646
29.29
296.34***
12 39 ***

t p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed)

0.021
585
21.55
159.46***

583
21.56
159.31
-0.150

0.103
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Examining measures of accounting based performance, 6 additional models were
tested and can be seen in Table 16. Models 1-3 used a dependent variable of 1 year
change in ROA and Models 3-6 used a dependent variable of 2 year change in ROA.
These results must be interpreted with caution as none of the six models had model
significance as indicated by the low Model chi-square numbers. In addition, chi-square
model difference tests show no improvements between Models 1,2, and 3 or Models 4,
5, or 6. In all six models, no support was found for FDSA having either a positive or
negative relationship with changes in accounting performance. Multi-co-linearity was
not an issue as all variables in models 1-6 had VTF values well under the recommended
4.0 with the highest VIF score of 2.4. Based on the low Model chi-square of accounting
based performance, additional tests of H8a and H8b on changes in ROA are not
significant and are not reported in this analysis.
Conclusion
Statistical support was found for H5, H6, H7a (using market-based measures of
changes in performance, but not accounting-based measures) and H8a in the US, but not
the UK (using market-based measures of changes in performance, but not accountingbased measures) but not for HI, H2, H3 or H7b or H8b using FDSA. Statistical support
was found for H5 using FDSA Count as the dependent variable. Table 17 summarizes
the hypotheses, predicted relationships and statistical findings. In the next chapter,
results of the study will be discussed in greater detail.

S.E.

1418
0.006
9.54

0.170
0.736
-0.003
0.007
0.274
0.199
-0.684
2.139
-0.003
0.019
IncludedI
Included[
-2.477
2.856

Coef.

1 yr A in ROA

3.172

-0.168
1418
0.007
10.33
0.79

1418
0.007
10.33
0

1.596

-1.211

1.402

-1.251

-0.003
0.247
-0.694
-0.004
Included
Included
-2.904
2.896

0.175
0.755
0.007
-0.003
0.280
0.248
2.141
-0.698
-0.004
0.019
Included
Included
-2.917
2.907

S.E.

0.736
0.007
0.279
2.139
0.019

Coef.

1 yr A in 1M)A

MODEL 3

0.166

Coef.

S.E.

l y r A in ROA

MODEL 2

t p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed)

AX2

N
R2
Model x2

Controls:
Country
Firm Age
log Finn Size
Free Cash Flow
Debt level
Year
Industry
Constant
Main effects:
FDSA
Interactions:
FDSAxCountry

Variable

DV:

MODEL 1

1232
0.008
10.01

1.165
1.293
-0.002
0.012
0.391
0.428
-0.445
3.215
-0.003
0.030
Included
Included
-4.713
4.439

Coef.

S.E.

2yrA in ROA

MODEL 4
S.E.

1232
0.008
10.13
0.120

-0.810

S.E.

1232
0.008
10.320
0.190

-2.257

5.129

2.553

1.399
1.194
-0.003
0.012
0.434
0.436
-0.503
3.220
-0.004
0.030
Included
Included
-5.095
4.501

Coef.

2yrA in ROA

MODEL 6

2.246 -0.277

1.285
1.165
-0.002
0.012
0.435
0.418
-0.445
3.216
-0.004
0.030
Included
Included
-4.943
4.486

Coef.

2yrA in ROA

MODEL 5

TABLE 16 - PANEL DATA REGRESSION-EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN FIRM PERFORMANCE
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TABLE 17 - SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS

H#
THEORY
VARIABLE
ANTECEDENTS
HI
P-A
Independence
H2
P-A
Outside Director Busyness
H3
P-A
CEO Duality
H4
P-P
Debt level
Blockholder ownership
H5
P-P
Pressure Resistance of
Dominant Owner
H6
P-P
EFFECTS
H7a
P-A
H7b
P-P

FDSA
FDSA

PREDICTED
RELATIONSHIP

FINDINGS

Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported

Positive

Supported

Positive
Negative

Supported
Not supported

MODERATORS
H8a
P-A
Governance Environment Stronger pos. rel in US
Supported
H8b
P-P
Governance Environment Stronger neg. rel. in US Not supported
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the study objectives are reviewed and the results of the empirical analyses
presented in Chapter IV are discussed. Theoretical and methodological contributions are
outlined and managerial and policy implications are discussed. Finally, a discussion of
the study limitations and opportunities for future research are presented.
Study Objectives
The objective of the study was to examine the antecedents and effects of
financially driven shareholder activism in the US and the UK using an empirical analysis.
Three research questions were introduced in Chapter I. First, what firm characteristics
are causing firms to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activism? Second, does
financially driven shareholder activism impact firm performance? Third, does governance
environment moderate the relationship between shareholder activism and firm
performance? This study also tested two competing perspectives in the context of
shareholder activism: principal-agent and principal-principal. The literature was
reviewed in Chapter II and eight hypotheses were developed and tested.
Using agency theory as a theoretical foundation, shareholder activism is the result
of dissatisfied shareholders concerned about conflicts of interest between principal and
agents and unhappiness with the level of monitoring by the board of directors. On the
other hand, the principal-principal perspective would suggest that shareholder activism is
the result of shareholders attempting to extract resources from the firm at the expense of
minority shareholders. Half of the hypotheses in this study tested agency theory and the
other half tested the principal-principal perspective. Eight hypotheses were empirically

115
tested using a longitudinal sample of 187 firms over eight years from 2000 to 2007 with a
final sample of 1,444 firm years. The incidence of firms being targeted by FDSAs was
captured via content analysis of news articles appearing in Factiva.
Summary of Findings
This study yielded a number of noteworthy results. Hypotheses 1-3 tested the
principal-agent perspective by examining whether agency problems due to board issues
could be predictors of FDSA. If shareholders were unhappy with firm management, it
might lead them to engage in FDSA as a mechanism to increase the monitoring of firm
managers. Three governance measures were tested: board independence, outside director
busyness, and CEO duality. Empirical results showed no support any of the first three
hypotheses. Interestingly, the hypothesis on board independence was statistically
significant but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. This finding conflicts with
previous research that suggests that board independence would lead to increased
monitoring of the firm and, thus, prevent FDSA. In this study, independent boards are
more likely to be targeted by FDSA. In conclusion, it would suggest that principal-agent
theory is a weak predictor of FDSA. It can also be argued that these three variables are
not good measures of governance. This will be discussed in greater detail in the
limitations and future research section of the paper.
The biggest contribution of the study revolves around the testing of the principalprincipal perspective in a developed country setting. All prior studies have assumed that
principal-principal conflicts only occur in emerging markets (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008;
Kim, Kim & Lee, 2008; Su et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008; Ward & Filatotchev, 2009).
Two of the three hypotheses relating to principal-principal perspective were supported as
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being predictors of FDSA. Hypothesis 4 suggested that low debt levels would make a
firm more attractive to a FDSA because of the potential of increasing leverage within the
firm to be used for cash payouts and asset sales. This hypothesis was not supported. The
next two hypotheses related to ownership structure. Hypothesis 5 posited that total
ownership percentage by blockholders will be negatively related to FDSA. Using the
principal-principal perspective, activists will not target firms who already have a
significant amount of blockholders as the opportunity to mandate changes is most likely
diminished. Empirical results show a significant negative relationship between the
percentage of blockholder ownership of the firm and FDSA. This finding supports the
principal-principal perspective that not all shareholders are the same and that large
blockholders potentially wield more power than other shareholders. High levels of
blockholder ownership diminish the probability of firms being targeted by FDSA. The
next hypothesis suggested that type of blockholder was an important factor predicting
FDSA. Not all blockholders are alike in that some have inherent conflicts of interest that
prevent them from putting pressure on firm management. Using the Brickley et al.
(1988) typography which classifies shareholders as pressure sensitive or pressure
resistant, it was hypothesized that concentrated ownership by a pressure resistant investor
would be an important predictor of FDSA. Under the principal-principal perspective,
FDSAs would not target a firm if the top owner was pressure sensitive and unwilling to
confront firm management. Hypothesis six was supported; FDSAs who are trying to
target firms with the potential for expropriation recognize that pressure sensitive top
owners may support top management and not yield to mandates from FDSAs. All in all,
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the principal-principal perspective did a much better job in identifying the predictors of
FDSA than did the principal-agent perspective.
While support for the principal-principal perspective was found on the
antecedents of FDSA, the principal-agent perspective is more relevant when examining
the impact of FDSA on changes in firm performance. Hypotheses 7 examined the effects
of FDSA on changes in firm performance. Again, principal-agent and principal-principal
perspectives were tested in competing hypotheses. Four measures of financial
performance were used: one and two year changes in market-based performance using
Tobin's Q and one and two year changes in accounting-based performance using ROA.
While no support was found for changes in accounting-based performance, results were
significant for one and two year changes in Tobin's Q based on Hypothesis 7a which
tested a principal-agent prediction. Thus, findings indicate that FDSA does lead to
improvements in market-based performance. In the full sample, results show that firms
targeted by FDSAs had a 6.7% one year increase in Tobin's Q and a 12.5% two year
increase in Tobin's Q. Furthermore, these results support numerous studies that have
found a positive relationship between shareholder activism and market-based
performance (Nesbitt, 1994; Opler & Sobokin, 1998; Anson et al., 2003; Barber 2006;
Boyson & Mooradian, 2007; Croci, 2007; Bessler et al., 2008; Buchanan & Young,
2009). This finding is important as it suggests that FDSA is recognized by the market as
being a mechanism to curb agency problems in the firm and that the market perceives
FDSA to be a positive action.
Thus, there is a distinct disconnect between the antecedents of FDSA and the
effects of FDSA. All the drivers of FDSA were principal-principal related yet the effects
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of FDSA support the principal-agent perspective. There could be many reasons for these
results. First, investors still perceive that there is value in a vocal shareholder targeting a
firm with FDSA and investors respond by driving up value of the stock, which increases
the value of Tobin's Q. Empirical results support this as findings of short-term stock
spikes after the announcements of activism are well documented in the literature
(Faulkner et al., 1990; Strickland et al., 1996; Anson et al., 2003; Klein & Zur, 2006;
Renneboog & Sazilagyi, 2006 and others). There may be perceptions that shareholder
activists will take actions to benefit all shareholders and thus, FDSA efforts are embraced
by the market. Second, while results show a positive relationship between FDSA and
market-based performance, there was no support of any relationship between FDSA and
accounting-based performance. The lack of support for hypotheses testing the effects
FDSA on changes in accounting-based performance is not surprising as there are so many
variables that contribute to a firm's accounting-based performance and accounting-based
performance can easily be manipulated by managers.
The last hypothesis examined the role of governance environment as a moderator
between FDSA and change in financial performance. Again competing hypotheses were
constructed testing principal-agent and principal-principal perspectives. Hypothesis 8a
was supported, which posited that the FDSA change in firm performance relationship
would be positive and stronger in the US than in the UK. For both one and two year
changes in Tobin's Q, empirical results support the principal-agent perspective, but not
the principal-principal perspective. Results show a one year increase in Tobin's Q of
6.8% and a two year increase of 14.3% for US firms. There are a few implications from
these findings. First, findings show that the governance environment does matter and
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that change in both one and two year Tobin's Q was significantly higher in the US than in
the UK. Second, the findings of this study add evidence to Aguilera et al. (2006) and
Toms and Wright (2005) studies that argue that there are unique differences between the
US and the UK even though both represent Anglo-American governance systems.
Specifically, descriptive statistics from this study show that there is significantly more
FDS A in the US and UK and that many other governance variables such as board
independence, outside director busyness, and CEO duality were significantly different
across the two countries. Again, principal-agent theory is a better predictor of FDS A
effects on changes in firm performance.
Theoretical and Methodological Contributions
For scholars, this dissertation makes many theoretical and methodological
contributions to the literature on shareholder activism. First, this research is one of the
few studies on shareholder activism that incorporates a multi-country sample. Results
support prior studies that show that governance environment is important and supports
the Aguilera et al. (2006) finding that US investors are more impatient that UK
institutional investors and turn over their portfolios more quickly. Second, this research is
the first study to test the principal-principal perspective in firms from developed
countries. Previous work has suggested principal-principal conflicts only occur in
emerging markets (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Kim, Kim & Lee, 2008; Su et al., 2008;
Young et al., 2008; Ward & Filatotchev, 2009). While Shleifer and Vishny (1986) write
that large shareholders have the potential of expropriation, this study provides
preliminary evidence that the threat of expropriation does exist in developed countries
like the UK and US. Furthermore, many studies take for granted the dispersed ownership
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of UK and US firms without realizing that there have been tremendous growth in
institutional ownership in both the US and the UK with institutional investor ownership
in the US reached over 60% by 2005 (Gillan & Starks (2007) and UK institutional
investor ownership is even higher at over 80% (ONS, 2007). This is the first study that
provides some evidence that institutional investors are growing powerful enough to cause
principal-principal problems within firms in developed countries. Third, agency theory
and the principal-agent perspective have been used extensively in the strategy and finance
literature. Researchers are starting to suggest that agency theory is limited in its
explanatory power and that other theories need to be developed to explain firm behavior.
Institutional theory and the principal-principal perspective add unique insight to the role
of ownership structure as a key internal governance mechanism (Denis & McConnell,
2003). Indeed, findings show that ownership structure via both blockholder ownership
and type of owner are both important drivers of FDSA. The findings support Round
(1976) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000), who argue that type of owner is equally as
important as ownership share. This study's findings also contribute to the ownership
structure research in that the Brickley et al. (1998) typology is tested in the setting of
shareholder activism and findings show that shareholder activists target firms with
pressure resistant dominant owners. Finally, the study made two methodological
contributions. First, the study employed a longitudinal panel data sample tracking
shareholder activism over eight years from 2000 to 2007. Most prior studies relied on
matched pair samples. Second, following Judge et al (2010), this study separated
incidences of shareholder activism into financially driven and socially-driven shareholder
activism.
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Managerial and Investor Implications
The findings of this study may be of interest to both managers and investors. For
managers, they should be aware that shareholder activism has grown significantly since
the early 2000s and that it is not likely to go away. This study shows why certain firms
are more likely to be targeted by shareholder activists. First, findings support numerous
studies that show that poor prior performance attracts the attention of shareholder
activists (Bethel et al 1998; Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; Mulherin & Poulsen, 1998; Choi,
2000; Thomas et al., 2005; Croci, 2007; Becht et al., 2009 and others). Shareholder
activism may be one of the first red flags that go up alerting other investors and managers
that there are problems with firm performance. Second, firm managers must pay more
attention to its ownership structure. They must recognize the growing power of both
blockholder owners and of pressure resistant dominant owners. Given that FDSAs target
firms with low blockholder ownership and firms with a pressure resistant dominant
owner, some activists may have ulterior motives to gain power and control that may not
be in the best interests of the firm. As Kulpa (2005) asserts, shareholder activists may be
wolves in sheep's clothing and that firm managers need to handle shareholder activists
with care. Firms need to be mindful of the needs of minority shareholders and balance all
shareholders' interests.
Last, findings of this study show that managing shareholder activism is made
more difficult as SAs currently have the support of the larger investment community,
which reacts positively to announcements of FDSA as shown by one and two year
increases in market-based performance.

Firm management must work quickly to

address shareholder concerns, while continuing to be skeptical of shareholder activists'
true motives.
This paper can provide some guidance to firms on how to avoid being targeted by
shareholder activists in the future. More specifically, if managers operate with high
levels of disclosure, they may be less apt to be pressured by powerful FDS As like hedge
funds. Hedge funds are a powerful investor group and must be treated with care.
Furthermore, this study provides some evidence that managers need to take shareholder
activism seriously. Managers need to institute governance reviews to make sure that
solid corporate governance standards and policies are in place and that good relationships
are developed with key shareholders. Firm managers need to be approachable and listen
to shareholders before activism becomes more aggressive. They also need to be
cognizant that minority shareholders, especially individual investors, also have a stake in
the company and that their needs should be evaluated as well.
The findings of this dissertation may be of interest to investors as well. First, the
findings may encourage more types of investors to engage in shareholder activism
especially if investors see positive gains from activism. This study reports one and two
year market-based performance increases of 6.7% and 12.5%, respectively, as a result of
FDS A. Second, investors may engage in increased bandwagon activities by joining in
concert with other activists. Smaller investors should be increasingly wary of a firm's
institutional investor base and how that base may be impacting company decisionmaking. A large blockholder base has the ability to exert a significant amount of control
over management. Furthermore, investors may want to take a closer look at the type of

dominant owner as the appearance of pressure-resistant dominant owners impacts the
level of FDSA in the firm.
Policy Implications
This dissertation provides policymakers with a number of interesting results
which may lead to a re-examination of governance laws and practices in both the UK and
the US. First, shareholder activism continues to grow in the UK, US and all around the
world. Policymakers need to consider what role shareholder activism should play within
their overall governance system (Judge et al., 2010). Clearly, some shareholders are
unhappy, yet continue to hold their shares despite their dissatisfaction with firm
management. While Romano (2001:3) suggests that shareholder activism and "fill the
void in managerial monitoring" and Dalton et al. (2003:373) note that "shareholder
activism is designed to encourage executives and directors to adopt practices that insulate
shareholders from managerial self-interest by providing incentives for executives to
manage firms in shareholders' long-term interests," findings of this study show that the
motivations of shareholder activism are larger than simply addressing agency problems
within the firm. A key finding of this study is that FDSA is not driven by agency
problems, but more by principal-principal problems.
Second, as findings suggest that principal-principal problems are drivers of
FDSA, policymakers need to consider the role of the legal environment. Denis and
McConnell (2003) identify the legal environment is an important external governance
mechanism along with the market for corporate control. Thus, policymakers need to
examine whether there is enough protection for minority shareholders and consider
strengthening laws to protect them. There is some evidence that the UK provides its
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smaller shareholders more rights through EGMs and binding proxy resolutions (Aguilera
et al., 2006). US policymakers may want to look at increasing shareholder rights of
investors. For example, US policymakers could consider making changes to the proxy
resolution process to give shareholders greater ability to vote out board of director
members in making it easier for dissatisfied shareholders to call an Extraordinary General
Meeting (EGM).
Third, policymakers need to be aware of the growth trends in institutional
ownership in the US and the UK and the potential for increased principal-principal
conflicts. Findings of this study show that FDSAs are targeting firms that have a high
potential for expropriation. This finding supports Morck et al. (2005), who argue that
concentrated ownership can cause misalignment of interests between the dominant
shareholders and the minority shareholders. Policymakers in the US and UK need to
continuously monitor the growth of institutional investor holdings. Developed countries
are starting to look like emerging markets with increasing power of more concentrated
ownership base. Policymakers may need to revisit whether powerful, yet currently
unregulated hedge funds need additional oversight and regulation. Increasing domination
of blockholder ownership could be a concern going forward. In addition, the Brickley et
al. (1988) typology provides interesting perspective on the power base of pressure
resistant dominant owners.
Fourth, with data on the US and the UK, policymakers can examine how different
corporate governance environments impact the level of shareholder activism and the
effects of shareholder activism in each country. The UK provides its shareholders a more
shareholder friendly governance environment which deters FDSA, while the US has been
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reluctant to make voluntary or mandatory changes to corporate governance policy. As a
result, there is much more shareholder activism in the US than in the UK.
Last, making changes to improve governance may not be that easy. The study
found that governance practices of board independence, outside director busyness, and
CEO duality had no impact on the level of shareholder activism. Thus, policymakers
need to delve deeper to better develop measures of what good corporate governance
looks like. UK policymakers may want to re-examine their voluntary codes of corporate
governance that mandate CEO duality. Even the UK is known for more involved
governance standards, the UK still has busier boards and less board independence than
the US. Dalton et al. (2003) suggest that the principal-agent perspective is limited and
that board oversight is important, but it is not being measured by CEO duality or board
independence. Furthermore, Forbes and Milliken state that:
The influence of board demography on firm performance may not be simple and
direct, as many past studies presume, but, rather, complex and indirect. To
account for this possibility, researchers must begin to explore more precise ways
of studying board demography that account for the role of intervening processes
(1999: 490).
Thus, policymakers will need to delve deeper to determine what makes good corporate
governance. This is only complicated as Aguilera (2005) notes that even defining good
governance is difficult to do. In summary, policymakers cannot depend on shareholder
activism to be the next mechanism to solve problems of corporate governance.
Study Limitations and Future Research
There were limitations to this paper that could be improved in future research
studies. First, there are distinct challenges to studying shareholder activism. For
example, it can be especially difficult to make causal links between shareholder activism
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and outcomes such as firm performance as there are many variables that influence firm
performance and changes in governance. In addition, much shareholder activism is
informal, behind closed doors negotiation that is hard to capture and study empirically.
This study used content analysis to capture the incidence of the formal FDSA, but clearly,
not all incidences of shareholder activism including informal activism were captured.
There is only one study that has looked at informal activism (Becht et al., 2009). There
may be other methods that will allow researchers to collect more precise measures of
shareholder activism. For example, future studies should consider building a larger
database of activism from not only news reports, but proxy resolutions and Schedule 13D
filings. A larger database would provide additional insight on which types of activism
work best.

In addition, there are always limitations to the use of archival data. Studies

like the Becht et al. (2009) study, which were able to get inside access to a shareholder
activist's operations enabled them to obtain a deep understanding of the motivations and
actions of the Hermes UK Focus Fund.
Second, while this study made the distinction between financially driven and
socially driven shareholder activism, this study's definition of FDSA is still extremely
broad. Future research could focus on specific aspects of shareholder dissatisfaction such
as compensation, governance, strategic and operational issues.
Third, this study relied on both dummy and continuous variables to capture
whether a firm was being targeted by a FDSA. However, this study did not examine any
details on the activists themselves. Most prior studies on shareholder activism
concentrate on one type of activist, such as hedge fund, pension fund, or blockholder
activists and one type of activism method (proxy resolution, announcement of being put
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on target list). There is anecdotal evidence that hedge funds may be contributing the
most to principal-principal problems within the firm with their aggressive techniques
(Kulpa, 2005). Future studies on shareholder activism should examine which type(s) of
shareholder activist(s) achieve the most results (positive or negative) and which type(s) of
activist(s) contribute the most to principal-principal conflicts within a target firm.
Fourth, with the results of the study suggesting that there are principal-principal
conflicts in firms from developed countries, additional work needs to be done to examine
the extent of principal-principal problems in firms in developed versus developing
economies. Prior research using the principal-principal perspective has focused on
principal-principal conflicts in firms in emerging economies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Su
et al., 2008; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Chen & Young, 2010; Jiang & Peng, 2010; Peng &
Jiang, 2010). More research needs to be done to examine just how FDSAs expropriate
resources. As principal-principal problems were found in the context of shareholder
activism, there may be other areas where principal-principal conflicts emerge in firms
from developed economies. More studies focusing on the growth of institutional
investors is needed.
Fifth, there are opportunities to build on the Brickley et al. (1988) typology
examining ownership type. As type of owner was relevant in the study of antecedents of
shareholder activism, the same framework can be used in other research settings.
Sixth, while agency theory is intuitively appealing, some of the traditional agency
measures, such as CEO duality, board size, board independence and outside director
busyness are relatively superficial proxies that attempt to identify the existence of
monitoring problems within the firm (Dalton et al., 2003). The measure of CEO duality

does not take into account the presence of lead outside directors that can play a role to
mitigate the power of combined CEO/Chair role. Additional research should focus on
more longitudinal case studies to determine how boards work and which boards are most
effective at monitoring and providing guidance on strategy issues.
Finally, this study only examined firms within an Anglo-American governance
system. It would be interesting to expand the scope of this study to examine the
antecedents and effects of shareholder activism in other countries with different
governance environments.
Conclusion
Shareholder activism is a growing phenomenon around the world. While it
provides a mechanism for shareholders to express their dissatisfaction with upper
management, there is a darker side to the drivers of shareholder activism in that powerful
activists may use shareholder activism as a method to expropriate resources from target
firms. In regard to the effects of FDSA, there was no impact on changes in accounting
performance, but a significant positive impact on changes in market based performance.
This finding suggests that there could be market inefficiencies at play as investors place
value on shareholder activism efforts.
As Monks and Minow (1996) suggest, there is no ideal corporate governance
system as all are failing in their attempt to balance shareholder and stakeholder interests.
John Carver, a noted governance expert states that, "governance theory will not be a 'one
size fits all' prescription as to structure and composition, but a coherent framework of
fundamental, global principles upon which each board's individual practices can be left
to vary in recognition of contextual and cultural particulars" (2010:150).
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In summary, this study directly tested the principal-agent perspective and the
principal-principal perspective in the unique setting of financially driven shareholder
activism. Results show that the principal-principal problems in target firms were better
predictors of FDSA than principal-agent problems. However, agency theory was more
effective in predicting the effects of FDSA on changes in market-based performance.
These findings open up doors for additional research of principal-principal problems
primarily amongst dominant owners. Finally, this study provides evidence that
governance environment is important. Key differences in governance found between the
US and the UK provides additional evidence that governance environment plays a crucial
role in the impact of FDSA on firm performance. To conclude, this study makes a
significant contribution to the literature on corporate governance and shareholder
activism and will hopefully generate additional research on these issues.
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APPENDIX A
CODE BOOK FOR CODERS
•
•
•
•
•

•

Date of article
Date of activism event
Target of the activism - Company targeted
Reason or goal of activism
Who initiated the activism
o Name of activist
o Type of activist
• Pension fund
• Hedge fund
• Mutual fund
• Individual investor
• Blockholders activists
• Shareholders
• Other
Ownership of activist
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